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I. INTRODUCTION
It was, pardon the pun, a signature image: a grainy photograph of a
celebrity civil defendant, clad in grey jailhouse scrubs, signing a settlement
agreement on the cot of his cinderblock cell. His incarceration was upon the
order of a federal judge, not for violating a criminal law or committing an act
of direct criminal contempt in court, but rather for engaging in bad faith
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misconduct at a confidential, court-ordered mediation of his civil case. The
settlement agreement was the end result of negotiations that began with that
mediation and ended with his decision to pay the plaintiffs a sum of money
in the hope of regaining his freedom. Faced with the choice, as framed by
one contemporaneous newspaper article, of "settle or jail," the defendant
elected the former. This article explores how confidential mediation
communications provided the factual basis for that dilemma, and suggests a
vehicle for ensuring that this outcome never repeats itself.
Over the last quarter century, mediation has evolved from a flexible,
informal dispute resolution vehicle into a process with its own values, norms,
and expectations. With this evolution has come a growing body of laws and
directives to guide participants and mediators, many of whom are further
subject to ethical standards imposed by credentialing organizations.' The
guidance provided pursuant to this structure has resulted in court-ordered
mediation developing into a largely uniform process across the various
jurisdictions of this country.
As more and more cases have settled through mediation, courts and
commentators increasingly perceive the mediation process as a means of
managing congested dockets.2 Beginning with amendments to Rule 16 of the
Assistant Professor, the Charleston School of Law. This article was presented at
the New Scholars Workshop at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools Meeting on
August 7, 2009. The author wishes to thank Rick Bales, Sheila Scheuerman, and Paul
Lund for their time and insights during the preparation of this article. I am also grateful
for the good work of my research assistants, Michael Callan Skinner and Josh Klinger.
Any errors or omissions in the article are my own.
I For instance, in Florida mediators certified for circuit court-ordered mediations are
certified pursuant to standards promulgated by the Florida Supreme Court's Dispute
Resolution Center, which also provides ethics rules for mediators. Fla. R. Certified and
Ct.-Appointed Mediators, Rule 10.100, et seq.,
http://www.flcourts.org/gen_public/adr/bin/RulesForMediators.pdf (last visited March
15, 2010). The rules for scheduling and conducting the mediation are contained in the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.710, et seq. Finally, issues such as
mediation confidentiality, and the exceptions to confidentiality, are addressed by statute.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.405 (West 2010).
2 See Alternative Dispute Resolution and Settlement Encouragement Act; Federal
Courts Improvements Act, and Need for Additional Federal District Court Judges:
Hearing on H.R. 2603 and H.R. 2294 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual
Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 5 (1997) [hereinafter "ADR
Hearings on 2603 and 2294") (stating, with regard to the goal of addressing "court
congestion, delay and cost of litigation:" "In our judgment, this measure [H.R. 2603]
could be improved significantly if we were to enlarge its scope by promoting and
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) in 1983,3 continuing with the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990,4 and culminating in the mandates of the ADR
Act of 1998, federal courts integrated alternative dispute resolution generally,
and mediation in particular, as a docket management tool.5 This integration
glossed over an inherent limitation in a court's ability to mandate
mediation-the confidentiality rules that almost universally applied to court-
annexed mediation6 made it impossible, or at least very difficult, for a court
to monitor the parties' compliance with its mediation order to the extent that
the order sought to impose a standard of participation for the parties during
the mediation.
Within the last decade, however, this limitation has effaced in response
to increasing judicial intrusion into the mediation process. Perhaps the high
water mark of this oversight of mediation from the bench came in the case of
Doe v. Francis,7 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Florida. There, Joe Francis, the principal of the Girls Gone Wild
entertainment company (hereinafter GGW),8 Joe Francis, was held in
contempt, and ultimately incarcerated for nearly a year, as a result of a chain
encouraging district courts, not only to use arbitration but to use other forms of
alternative dispute resolution as well, and, in particular, mediation.").
3 See In re Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165,
210-11 (1983) advisory committee's note (discussing use of settlement conferences and
extrajudicial techniques for purpose of facilitating settlement early in litigation). The
Advisory Committee's discussion never mentions mediation, however, instead relying on
the potential to refer the parties to "another member of the court or ... a magistrate," or
the employment of "adjudicatory techniques outside the courthouse." Id.
4 The stated purpose of the district court plans developed pursuant to the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA) was "to facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil
cases on the merits, monitor discovery, improve litigation management, and ensure just,
speedy, and inexpensive resolution of civil disputes." 28 U.S.C. § 471 (1990). This
purpose was advanced, in the eyes of Congress, by "utilization of alternative dispute
resolution programs in appropriate cases." Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-650, § 102(D) (1990). In response to the ADR provisions of the CJRA, most
district courts had implemented mediation programs by 1996. ELIZABETH PLAPINGER &
DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 3 (1996).
5 This was, in fact, the stated purpose of the ADR Act of 1998. See Hearings, supra
note 2, at 2 ("The effect of these changes will be to provide for a quicker, more efficient
way to resolve some Federal cases when the parties so choose, and to lessen the incentive
to litigate and, consequently, the caseload burdens faced by the Federal judiciary.").
6 See infra Part V(B).
7 Doe v. Francis, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 241 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 8, 2003).
8 The actual entity that is behind the GGW entertainment brand is Mantra Films,
LLC. Id.
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of events arising out of comments and behavior at a confidential mediation.
In his contempt order, the judge went so far as to direct Francis regarding not
only what he was allowed to say at mediation, but also his attire and choice
of footwear.9 The Francis case could be treated as an anomaly, as it marks
the only instance in which a mediation participant was jailed for his conduct
at mediation. As this article will discuss, however, Francis is simply an
extreme example of an otherwise entirely consistent trend in the federal
district courts towards imposing judicial oversight upon the mediation
process.
Paradoxically, federal courts have still adopted and enforced rules
ostensibly meant to protect the confidentiality of mediation, and gone so far
as to sanction parties for bringing motions that described what transpired or
what was said at a mediation.' 0 Thus, a litigant considering the filing of a
sanctions motion based on her opponent's words or actions faces a dilemma:
she may well succeed in obtaining sanctions against her opponent, or at least
coloring the judge's perception of the opponent's case, through a motion that
provides a factually detailed account of the events that took place behind the
closed doors of a mediation. She may, on the other hand, find herself on the
receiving end of a sanctions order simply for filing such a motion, should the
court conclude that she has violated a local confidentiality rule or order.
This article proposes a partial reversal of the trend toward judicially-
managed mediation, through the indirect method of adopting a proscription
against using statements or conduct at mediation as a basis for most sanctions
motions under the FRCP Rule 16. Part II of the article reviews generally the
evolution of federal mediation rules and statutes, with particular attention to
mediation's integration as a docket management tool. This development over
the last two decades has led to the creation of widely divergent approaches to
mediation confidentiality in the federal courts, with some courts adopting
detailed rules and others relying on common law privilege principles, to the
extent the courts preserve mediation confidentiality at all. The disparate
treatment of mediation confidentiality, and its relationship to the courts'
ability to monitor the parties' participation, has led perhaps inevitably to the
explosion in motion practice related to mediation good faith described in Part
III of this article. Part IV reviews the policy reasons for recognizing and
implementing some form of a mediation confidentiality rule, highlighting the
fact that the narrow understanding of the function of confidentiality reflected
in federal rules and case law, often limiting it to the interests and principles
9 Francis, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D at 241, Civil Minutes-General, at 4.
10 See infra text accompanying notes 190-92.
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advanced by Federal Rule of Evidence 408, has led to an increasing
willingness on the part of the federal judiciary to consider sanctions motions
that rely on confidential information. Finally, Part V considers alternative
means of resolving this conflict, and settles ultimately upon the adoption of a
rule-based, limited federal mediation privilege as the most effective means of
preventing the enforcement of mediation orders from developing into a
burgeoning field of motion practice that thwarts the very docket management
goal that led the federal courts to rely heavily on mediation in the first
place." Such a rule would allow the district courts to monitor basic
compliance with their orders referring cases to mediation, but prevent the
sort of detailed inquiry into words and negotiating posture that landed Joe
Francis in jail for nearly a year.
II. FOLDING MEDIATION INTO THE DOCKET MANAGEMENT PROCESS
It is ironic in retrospect that of all the alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) processes the federal courts could have embraced as a docket
management tool, they have overwhelmingly adopted mediation as the
vehicle of choice for resolution of disputes outside the courtroom. 12 With its
emphasis on party autonomy and the mediator's lack of authority to compel
the parties even to participate, mediation seems particularly ill-suited for
incorporation into a court-mandated process that by definition entails an
element of coercion. 13 In particular, the widely-accepted notion that what
transpires at mediation is confidential, a premise that protects the above-
referenced party autonomy and prevents coerced settlement, presents a
substantial challenge to enforcing the mediation referral directive that is
often incorporated into a typical case management order.
Part of the explanation for mediation's emergence as a docket
management tool lies in the growing dissatisfaction with litigation as a
11 See infra Part V.
12 Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected
Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 21
(2001).
13 See Lucy V. Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism:
Two-Headed Monster or Two Sides of the Coin?, 1993 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 13 (discussing
pressure from court to participate in "voluntary" mediation); Stephan Landsman, ADR
and the Cost of Compulsion, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1593 (2005) (analyzing effect of both
contractual and court compelled mediation on process).
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dispute resolution process during the 1970s and early 1980s.14 This period
coincided with the development of federal rules and statutory ADR law,
beginning with the amendment of FRCP Rule 16, in 1983, to include as a
case management issue "facilitating the settlement of the case."1 5 The rule
was amended in 1993, directing the courts to consider special procedures to
assist in resolving disputes. 16 At the same time mediation was coming into its
own as the ADR tool of choice, judges increasingly came to see their role as
that of docket managers. As part of this new perception, the judiciary
developed a preference for settlement over trial, placing "their institutional
authority behind settlement as the mode of disposition to be preferred."' 7
This disposition toward encouraging settlement was despite the fact, as
documented by Professor Hensler and others, that litigants expressed a
preference for more formal dispute resolution that provides an opportunity to
be heard and a more "fair" forum. 18
One particularly unfortunate consequence of incorporating mediation, by
inference at least, into the Rule 16 checklist was that it muddied the critical
14 See Deborah R. Hensler, ADR Research at the Crossroads, 2000 J. DisP. RESOL.
71 (discussing evolution of court-sanctioned ADR from the 1970s through the 1990s).
Peter N. Thompson, Enforcing Rights Generated in Court-Connected Mediation-
Tension Between the Aspirations of a Private Facilitative Process and the Reality of
Public Adversarial Justice, 19 OHIo ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 509, 516 (2004) ("Certainly,
the rapid growth of the ADR movement was fueled in large part by a rejection of the
adversariness and inflexibility of the litigation process.").
15 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5).
16 Id. Note, however, that these procedures were and are only to be mandated "when
authorized by statute or local rule." FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(9). This criterion would not be
satisfied until the advent of, and drafting of rules arising out of, the CJRA and the ADR
Act of 1998, discussed later in this article.
17 Judith Resnik, Mediating Preferences: Litigant Preferences for Process and
Judicial Preferences for Settlement, 2002 J. DIsp. RESOL. 155, 159; see also Ellen E.
Deason, Procedural Rules for Complementary Systems of Litigation and Mediation-
Worldwide, 80 NOTRE DAmE L. REV. 553, 559-60 (2005) (discussing institutionalization
of settlement procedures under federal rules); cf Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected
Mediation in General Civil Cases: What We Know from Empirical Research, 17 OHIO
ST. J. ON DIsP. REsOL. 641, 661-63 (2002) (finding that attorneys and judicial personnel
held more favorable views of mediation's effect on time and cost of litigation than views
held by parties themselves).
18 Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It's Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology,
2002 J. Disp. REsOL. 81, 82-88; Landsman, supra note 13.
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distinction between mediation and the judicial settlement conference.' 9 Long
before the implementation of mediation as a docket management tool, the
federal courts have relied on the judicial settlement conference as a means of
resolving lawsuits.20 These settlement conferences differ from mediation,
however, in two critical respects. First, they have always been
unambiguously treated as a means of docket management, with the objective
of obtaining a dismissal of the lawsuit. In contrast, mediation is not, or at
least should not be, focused on settlement at the expense of principles such as
client autonomy. In fact, mediation ethics standards often proscribe
mediators from engaging in conduct that is driven by a desire for a high
settlement rate, or attempting to market their services on the basis of
settlement statistics.21
The judicial settlement conference also differed from mediation insofar
as it included no confidentiality protections-the parties were across the
table from the judge and from each other, and clearly nothing that was said
could be kept from the court's purview. This, in turn, allowed the court to
evaluate whether a party had participated in the settlement conference "in
good faith": a concept that had no precedent in mediation scholarship. As
will be discussed in Part III, it was this notion of good faith, metastasized
from the old judicial settlement conference into the context of court-ordered
mediation that led to the erosion of confidentiality in court-ordered
mediation.22
Not long after the amendments to Rule 16 brought ADR, and therefore
mediation, into the courts' docket management tool kit, statutory
developments further propelled the adoption of ADR by the courts.
Beginning with the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA),23 Congress
mandated that courts implement a civil justice expense and delay reduction
19 See Welsh, supra note 12, at 25 ("Court-connected mediation of non-family civil
cases is developing an uncanny resemblance to the judicially-hosted settlement
conference."); Thompson, supra note 14, at 517.
20 See Holly A. Streeter-Schaefer, A Look at Court Mandated Civil Mediation, 49
DRAKE L. REV. 367, 371 (2001) (discussing history of evolution from settlement
conference to court-ordered mediation).
21 See MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS I(B) (2005) ("A mediator
shall not undermine party self-determination by any party for reasons such as higher
settlement rates .... ); M.D. TENN. LOCAL R. Appendix 1(a), Guide 5(f) ("In any
personal advertisement, an Arbitrator, Mediator or Evaluator shall not make any claims
about his or her participation in the ADR program of the District Court other than the
simple statement that the neutral is a member of the ADR panel of this Court.").
22 See infra text accompanying notes 33-61.
23 Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 471 (1990).
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plan.2 4 This included the use of ADR processes, including mediation.
Pursuant to the CJRA, the courts could direct party participation in judicial
settlement conferences as part of their civil justice expense and delay
reduction plan.25 Notably, Congress contemplated during the creation of the
CJRA that the courts adopt procedures to protect the confidentiality of any
ADR process, and not just mediation.26 Nearly a decade later, the Alternative
Dispute Resolution Act of 199827 amended and expanded upon the earlier
1988 Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act,28 with the stated
purpose of reducing backlog through "greater efficiency in achieving
settlements." 29 The ADR Act specifically referenced mediation as an ADR
process, and directed the various federal courts to develop their own ADR
rules. 30 This direction that courts create and adopt alternative dispute
resolution procedures at the local level has led to the crazy quilt of largely
inconsistent guidelines that govern compulsory mediation in the federal
courts.31
Thus, by the beginning of this decade the federal courts had folded
mediation into their pretrial case management processes under Rule 16, and
had adopted local rules of varying detail that set forth the standards by which
24 Id
25 Id. at § 473(b)(5).
26 Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 102 (1990)
(Congressional Statement of Findings).
27 Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-315 (1998) (codified at
28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58 (2010)).
28 Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702 (1988)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58 (1988)).
29 Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-315, § 2(1) (1998)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58 (2010)); see also James J. Alfini & Catherine G.
McCabe, Mediating in the Shadow of the Courts: A Survey of the Emerging Case Law, 54
ARK. L. REv. 171, 173 (2001) ("Court-sponsored mandatory mediation programs
generally are promoted and established, however, for reasons of judicial economy, with
little attention given to mediation's core values.").
30 Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-315, § 3 (1998)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 65 1(b) (2010)).
31 The lack of uniformity created by the ADR Act was not unintentional, however.
As pointed out in Gregory A. Litt, No Confidence: The Problem of Confidentiality by
Local Rule in the ADR Act of 1998, 78 TEx. L. REv. 1015 (2000), and adumbrated by
John Maull, ADR in the Federal Courts: Would Unformity Be Better?, 34 DUQ. L. REV.
245 (1996), the legislative history of the Act suggested that Congress wished to reserve to
the courts the discretion to craft their own ADR programs based on their varying
caseloads.
720
[Vol. 25:3 2010]
IS IT TIME FOR A FEDERAL MEDIATION EXCLUSIONARY RULE?
courts would gauge compliance with referral orders. At the same time, no
court had expressly abrogated the principle of mediation confidentiality, and
in fact many courts adopted rules protecting the confidentiality of what was
said or done at mediation. 32 It was the subsequent development of a body of
law that both exercised control over the parties' participation in mediation,
and purported to recognize (or at least not expressly eliminate) mediation
confidentiality, that created the space within which parties could seek
sanctions for noncompliance with a mediation referral order, but would risk
being sanctioned themselves if the contents of the motion violated local
mediation confidentiality rules.
A. The Development of the Notion of Mediation Good Faith
As discussed above, the source of the courts' perception of a right to
regulate what transpires at mediation derives from FRCP Rule 16(c)(2)(I),
which allows a court, at a pretrial conference, to consider "settling the case
and using special procedures to assist in resolving the dispute when
authorized by statute or local rule." 33 Pursuant to the mandate of the ADR
Act of 1998, all district courts now incorporate ADR procedures into their
local rules, and have the authority to impose special procedures, usually
including mediation, as a means of controlling their dockets. 34 Many courts
and commentators have concluded that this authority to mandate
participation in ADR was not, however, derived solely from Rule 16.35
Rather, beginning with the case of G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat
Corp.,36 courts perceived their ability to sanction noncompliance with an
order related to settlement procedures as deriving not from the language of
32 See infra Part II.B, and Appendix.
33 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(I).
34 See infra Appendix for rules of the various U.S. district courts adopted pursuant
to the ADR Act of 1998, or as part of a pilot program created under the earlier CJRA.
35 Amy M. Pugh & Richard A. Bales, The Inherent Power of the Federal Courts to
Compel Participation in Nonbinding Forms of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 42 DUQ.
L. REV. 1, 2, 10 (2003); Maureen A. Weston, Checks on Participant Conduct in
Compulsory ADR: Reconciling the Tension in the Need for Good-Faith Participation,
Autonomy, and Confidentiality, 76 IND. L.J. 591, 623 (2001); see also Robert J. Pushaw
Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L.
REV. 735 (2001) (overview of the inherent powers of the federal courts).
36 G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989).
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Rule 16, but from the inherent authority of the court "to preserve the
efficiency, and more importantly the integrity, of the judicial process."37
One cannot ascribe solely to Heileman and its immediate progeny,
however, the notion that a court may impose a good faith standard upon
one's participation in mandated mediation. In fact, the Heileman case did not
deal with mediation at all. Rather, Heileman addressed the issue of whether a
district judge could compel a party's attendance at a pretrial settlement
conference, when that party was represented by counsel. Judge Kanne's
opinion expressly stated that a court could not "coerce settlement," and
attempted to draw a fine distinction between compelling attendance and
compelling more than the most perfunctory participation. 38 Perhaps
anticipating the mischief to come, Judge Posner in his dissent was explicit in
reasoning that there is no authority for a court to compel negotiation in good
faith, and concluded that the magistrate judge overstepped his authority by
directing not merely the appearance of a corporate representative at a
settlement conference, but a representative with "full settlement authority." 39
Judge Manion's dissent speaks further to the hollowness of the distinction
articulated by the majority, between attendance and good faith participation,
noting that requiring the former without the latter meant a court would
"waste litigants' time doing what their attorneys could have done (and were
hired to do)."40
The recognition by the Heileman court of a district judge's inherent
authority to compel a party's attendance at a pretrial settlement conference
dovetailed with the courts' longstanding, rule-based authority to sanction a
party who failed to participate in a settlement conference in good faith. This
authority, once again, derived directly from Rule 16, which provides that a
trial court could issue a sanctions order if a party or its attorney "is
substantially unprepared to participate-or does not participate in good
faith-in the conference." 41 Since the advent of this rule decades ago, courts
have sanctioned parties who appeared at settlement conferences unprepared
to negotiate, or lacking the authority to negotiate in good faith.42
37 Id. at 652.
3 8 Id. at 653.
39 Id. at 658 (Posner, J., dissenting).
40 Id. at 669 (Manion, J., dissenting).
41 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f)(1)(B); see also supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
42 See, e.g., In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1409 (11th Cir. 1991) (affirming criminal
contempt order based in part on nonparty insurer's refusal to appear at pretrial settlement
conference); Francis v. Women's Obstetrics and Gynecology Group, P.C., 144 F.R.D.
646, 648-49 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (sanctioning attorneys under Rule 16(f) for appearing at
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Examples of courts sanctioning parties for their failure to participate in
good faith at settlement conferences began to appear in the mid-1980s, and
increased substantially in the years that followed.43 Almost without
exception, the sanctions appear always to have been directed at a recalcitrant
defendant (rather than a plaintiff) whose conduct thwarted a judicial attempt
to facilitate settlement.44 Typically, these sanctions orders related to similar
patterns of conduct. For instance, a district judge may have ordered that a
representative of a liability carrier attend the settlement conference, and the
failure to send such a representative, or a representative with adequate
authority to settle the case, resulted in the imposition of sanctions.45 Or, even
more commonly, courts have sanctioned parties and their attorneys for failing
to show up at all.46 Courts have also sanctioned parties for wasting the
settlement conference unprepared to discuss issues related to insurance coverage);
Dvorak v. Shibata, 123 F.R.D. 608, 610-11 (D.Neb. 1988) (awarding sanctions to
plaintiff for defense attorneys' substantial unpreparedness to participate in settlement
conference); cf Simpson v. City of Philadelphia, 660 F. Supp. 951, 952 (E.D. Pa. 1987)
(imposing sanctions on attorney for being substantially unprepared to discuss issues in
case at pretrial conference); In re Philbert, 340 B.R. 886, 890-91 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ind.
2006) (relying alternatively on Rule 16 or court's inherent powers to sanction counsel for
failure to appear at contested hearing on motion for relief from automatic stay).
43 See, e.g., PHLO Corp. v. Stevens, No. OOCIV.3619, 2001 WL 1398652 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 9, 2001); Mordechai v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., No. 99CIV3000RWSTHK,
2001 WL 699062 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2001); Hughes v. The Lillian Goldman Family,
LLC, No. OOCIV.2388, 2000 WL 1228996 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2000); Carol L. Izumi &
Homer C. La Rue, Prohibiting "Good Faith" Reports Under the Uniform Mediation Act:
Keeping the Adjudication Camel Out of the Mediation Tent, 2003 J. DisP. RESOL. 67, 75
(detailing growth in good faith motion practice after 1990); Landsman, supra note 13, at
1606-07 (detailing growth in good faith motion practice after 1990).
44 See, e.g., Guillory v. Domtar Indus. Inc., 95 F.3d 1320, 1334-35 (5th Cir. 1996)
(holding that defendants' refusal to make a settlement offer with realistic potential of
being accepted by the plaintiff demonstrated a lack of good faith such that the imposition
of sanctions was well within the court's discretion); Dvorak, 123 F.R.D. at 611 (imposing
sanctions on defendant who was substantially unprepared to participate in the settlement
conference). But see Those Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. GMC Land
Servs., Inc., No. 06-60325--CIV, 2007 WL 3306964 (S.D.Fla. Nov. 6, 2007) (defendant
sought sanctions against plaintiff for failing to attend mediation with corporate
representative).
45 See, e.g., Lockhart v. Patel, 115 F.R.D. 44, 45 (E.D. Ky. 1987) (striking pleadings
of defendant whose insurance carrier sent "flunky" from home office instead of
representative with adequate settlement authority).
46 See, e.g., Rogers v. City of Warren, 302 F.App'x 371, 379 (6th Cir. 2008)
(affirming sanction of dismissal for failure to appear at settlement conference and status
conference); Frontier Ins. Co. v. Blaty, 454 F.3d 590, 604 (6th Cir. 2006) (affirming
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court's time by scheduling a settlement conference and then arriving with
little or no settlement authority and, in some instances, with the stated intent
of taking the case to trial.47
Thus, by the late 1990s it was well-established that courts could compel
represented parties to appear at judicial settlement conferences, and could
sanction them if they arrived unprepared to negotiate in what the court
perceived to be good faith. On the heels of this development, as discussed
above, Congress mandated through the ADR Act of 1998 that the district
courts develop local ADR rules as a means of controlling their dockets. 48 It
was perhaps inevitable, then, that at some point the courts would extend their
authority to adjudge a litigant's good faith participation in a settlement
conference to include mediations ordered pursuant to local rule. In so doing,
the federal courts have arguably created a new sort of ADR vehicle, not quite
mediation but not a settlement conference either, the conduct of which is
subject to the watchful eye of the ordering court.
The courts have proven remarkably facile in constructing this new power
to regulate mediation out of the rule-based, or inherent, authority they
wielded at the settlement conference. The catalyst for this expansion may
well be the reasoning in Heileman, which rested on a court's inherent power
"to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." 49 If the courts
have this authority by implication and Congress has explicitly directed them
default against insurance agency for failure to appear at settlement conference); Nostalgia
Network, Inc. v. Rayle, 11 F. App'x 720, 721 (9th Cir. 2001) (reversing default judgment
against defendant for failure to appear at settlement conference); Goldman, Antonetti,
Ferraiuoli, Axtmayer & Hertell v. Medfit Int'l., Inc., 982 F.2d 686, 693 (1st Cir. 1993)
(affirming dismissal under Rule 16(f) for, inter alia, failure to appear at settlement
conference).
47 See, e.g., Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 1397 (9th Cir. 1993)
(affirming sanctions award for failure of party to appear with settlement authority); In re
Novak, 932 F.2d at 1409 (affirming criminal contempt conviction of insurance
representative who failed to appear at settlement conference); Guillory, 95 F.3d at 1335
(5th Cir. 1996) (affirming imposition of sanctions on defendant who arrived at mediation
of personal injury case involving quadriplegic plaintiff with $100,000 in settlement
authority and stated desire to try case); Schwartzman, Inc. v. ACF Indus., Inc., 167
F.R.D. 694, 699-700 (D.N.M. 1996) (ordering good faith participation of United States
in settlement conference, after attorney appeared with nuisance value settlement
authority).
48 See ADR Hearings on 2603 and 2294, supra note 2.
49 G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 651 (7th Cir.
1989); see also In re Atl. Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 135, 145 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that
district judge had inherent authority, without reliance on ADR Act or local rules, to order
parties to mediate).
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to implement local ADR procedures as a means of docket control, then a
district judge certainly has the ability to wield this tool as a means of
ensuring the parties are not flouting the court's authority behind the closed
doors of the mediation conference, does he not?
A growing number of cases have resoundingly answered this question in
the affirmative, either directly or by implication. For example, in Nick v.
Morgan's Foods, Inc.,so the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri considered a motion for sanctions brought by a sexual harassment
plaintiff for, inter alia,51 alleged failure to participate in good faith in a court-
ordered mediation. At issue was the decision by Morgan's Foods to send a
representative to mediation with a maximum settlement authority of $500,
and without any ability to reconsider this position without consulting the
company's general counsel by telephone. 52 These facts were reported by the
mediator 53 to the trial court after the perhaps inevitable impasse, and the
judge responded by issuing an order to show cause why Morgan's Foods
should not be sanctioned. After Morgan's Foods responded by questioning
whether the trial court had the authority to impose sanctions for its alleged
lack of good faith, the court entered an order explaining that it maintained
both express authority under Rule 16 and inherent authority to impose
sanctions.54 Interestingly, the court's basis for claiming express authority was
not the local rule, which required good faith participation in mediation, but
rather Rule 16's provision allowing courts to order parties "to participate in
pretrial proceedings, including hearings to facilitate settlement."55 Thus, the
district judge ignored the distinction between mediation and a pretrial
settlement conference.56 He also arguably ignored the mandate of his district
50 Nick v. Morgan's Foods, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (E.D.Mo. 2000); affd, 270
F.3d 590, 597 (8th Cir. 2001).
51 The Morgan's Foods court also considered whether sanctions were justified based
on Morgan's Foods' failure to submit a pre-mediation memorandum in accordance with
the court's ADR order. Id. at 1061-62.
52 Morgan's Foods, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1058.
53 The local rules of the Eastern District of Missouri require a mediator to report
back to the judge "any willful or negligent failure to attend any ADR conference, to
substantially comply with the Order Referring Case to Alternative Dispute Resolution, or
otherwise participate in the ADR process in good faith." E.D. Mo. Loc. R. 16-6.05(A).
The last two of these criteria were apparently implicated in the Morgan's Foods case.
54 Morgan's Foods, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1059-61.
55 Id. at 1060.
56 An earlier example of the same judicial miscategorization can be found in Francis
v. Women's Obstetrics and Gynecology Group, P.C., 144 F.R.D. 646, 646 (W.D.N.Y.
1992). In this earlier Francis case, the district court considered a motion for sanctions
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court's own local rules, which purported to ensure mediation
confidentiality.57
As it turned out, Morgan's Foods was a harbinger of things to come. 58 In
the years immediately following, trial courts59 increasingly considered
brought by plaintiffs in a medical malpractice action against defendants who allegedly
failed to act in good faith at an extrajudicial conference held as part of a "settlement
week" orchestrated by the local bar association. The parties were directed to appear
pursuant to an "Order to Mediation," and to provide written statements to the mediator.
Relying on the court's Rule 16(f) authority to mandate good faith participation in a
pretrial conference, the district court sanctioned defense counsel for failure to provide the
statement, and for arriving at mediation with an unresolved insurance coverage issue.
5 7 E.D. Mo. Loc. R. 16-6.04(A).
58 For other examples of cases blurring the line between settlement conference and
mediation, see Kerestan v. Merck & Co. Long Term Disability Plan, No. 05 CIV. 3469,
2008 WL 2627974 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2008) (order relying on cases involving both
mediation and settlement conference misconduct as a basis to impose sanctions under
rule 16(f) for failure to appear at a settlement conference); Regan v. Trinity Distribution
Serv., Inc., 251 F.R.D. 108, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (imposing sanctions for appearing
unprepared at "mediation," which apparently was actually a settlement conference
attended by the judge); Those Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. GMC Land
Servs., Inc., No. 06-60325-CIV (S.D. Fla. 2007) (order relying on inherent powers and
Rule 16 settlement conference rule as basis to consider mediation sanctions motion).
5 Although this discussion is limited to trends in the federal courts, note that state
courts do not appear immune from the urge to inquire regarding what transpired at a
court-ordered mediation. See, e.g., Erickson v. Smith, 909 So.2d 1173, 1175-76 (Miss.
Ct. App. 2005) (describing motion for sanctions in chancery court that described
mediation settlement negotiations); Smith v. Archer, 812 N.E.2d 218, 219-20 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2004) (observing that appellants had disclaimed argument for bad faith sanctions
based on amount of defendant's monetary offer); Stoehr v. Yost, 765 N.E.2d 684, 687
(Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (reasoning that mediation sanctions motion required evidence of bad
faith, and insurer's unwillingness to "really listen" was insufficient) (emphasis in
original); Avril v. Civilmar, 605 So.2d 988, 990 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (quashing
sanctions order based on inadequacy of offer made at mediation). But see Rawlings v.
Rawlings, 200 P.3d 662, 669 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) (noting that decision not to award
sanctions was "consistent with the high degree of confidentiality afforded to the
mediation process."); Nadeau v. Nadeau, 957 A.2d 108, 117 (Me. 2008) (declining to
consider evidence of mediation communications under Maine's version of Rule 408); In
re Acceptance Ins. Co., 33 S.W.3d 443, 454-55 (Tex. App. 2000) (ruling sanctions order
was void where it violated practice code's confidentiality provisions). What emerges
from the foregoing cases is the conclusion that jurisdictions with express confidentiality
provisions which carve out narrow and specific exceptions, such as those found in the
Uniform Mediation Act, appear far less likely to consider sanctions motions that purport
to describe bad faith conduct at mediation. But see Massey v. Beagle, 754 So.2d 146, 147
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (affirming trial judge's order denying sanctions for violating
mediation confidentiality, which is statutory in Florida, where plaintiffs related in their
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sanctions motions for failure to participate in good faith in court-ordered
mediation.60 In most, or perhaps all, of these instances, the motions relied for
their substance on communications that would otherwise have been protected
by corresponding mediation confidentiality rules. As will be explored in
more detail in Part III, the courts almost never considered, or even
mentioned, the arguable breach of mediation confidentiality in their analyses,
focusing instead on whether the described conduct constituted a violation of
their mediation referral order or local rules mandating good faith
participation.61 Often, the outcome involved monetary sanctions against
counsel and parties based on their ostensibly confidential mediation
communications or conduct.
Although the prospect of monetary sanctions for failure to satisfy a trial
judge's amorphous sense of good faith was disturbing enough to lawyers
advising clients regarding their obligations at mediation, at least no one had
gone to jail over the issue. That is, no one had gone to jail until 2007, when
Joe Francis earned the dubious distinction of being the first federal litigant to
find himself ordered to jail for egregious behavior at mediation. By way of
background, this federal lawsuit commenced in 2003, in the wake of a wave
of state and federal criminal charges arising out of the activities of GGW
founder Joe Francis and his production team in Panama City Beach in March
of that year.62 The plaintiffs included seven women who alleged they were
underage when they were filmed by GGW cameramen. 63 All sought
compensatory damages under various statutory and common law theories of
own sanctions motion alleged "bad faith" by insurance adjuster who attempted to
negotiate structured, rather than lump sum, settlement). See also Alfini and McCabe,
supra note 29 (reviewing primarily state law cases dealing with mediation good faith and
enforcement of mediated settlement agreements).
60 In fact, this trend predated Morgan 's Foods, and appears to have begun roughly at
the same time that the ADR Act of 1998 became law. See James R. Coben & Peter N.
Thompson, Disputing Irony: A Systematic Look at Litigation About Mediation, 11 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REv. 43, 119 (2006) (providing empirical research that demonstrates growth in
this type of motion practice). Note also that Morgan 's Foods was cited in briefs in
numerous other, unreported cases in which sanctions were sought for alleged mediation
misconduct.
61 Coben & Thompson, supra note 60.
62 Francis's state court charges can be found in the criminal files of the cases styled
State of Florida v. Joseph R. Francis, et al., Cases No. 03001036 and 03001047, Circuit
Court of Bay County, Florida. The companion federal criminal case was styled United
States v. Mantra Films, Inc., No. 5:06CR78/RS (N.D. Fla. Sept. 12, 2006).
63 Complaint at 1 30, Doe v. Francis, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 241 (N.D. Fla. Oct.
8, 2003).
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recovery. The judge in the case,64 who was simultaneously presiding over a
companion federal criminal case 65 arising out of the same underlying facts,
entered a case management order referring the matter to mediation.66
Pursuant to the order, the parties scheduled mediation in Panama City Beach
on March 30, 2007.
The mediation was a disaster from the outset.67 Francis arrived four
hours late, wearing sweat bottoms, a t-shirt, flip-flops, and a backwards
baseball cap. The mediator chose to open the mediation with two semi-joint
sessions, with the plaintiffs' lawyers (but not the plaintiffs themselves) going
to defendants' caucus room and making opening statements to defendant and
defense counsel, and then reversing the process to allow defense counsel to
address the plaintiffs, without Francis present, immediately afterward. As the
plaintiffs' lawyers began their opening statement, Francis allegedly placed
his feet on the conference table, soles toward opposing counsel, and
purported to ignore counsel's opening statement until beginning an expletive-
laden response in which Francis stated he would not pay the plaintiffs a
dime, and would "bury" plaintiffs' counsel and their firms.68
Remarkably, the mediation lasted for over a day following the outburst.
Shortly after the parties reached an impasse, plaintiffs served a motion for
sanctions, which described in detail the events at mediation, and extensively
quoted from Francis's statements. 69 The motion inferentially treated the issue
of mediation confidentiality as a matter of state law, characterizing Francis's
threat to "bury" the lawyers as a threat of violence that would fall within an
64 Judge J. Richard Smoak was appointed to the federal bench in 2005. He was a
graduate of West Point, a civil lawyer in private practice since 1973, and a certified
circuit court mediator in the state of Florida. See judicial profile at
www.fjc.gov/servlet/tGetnfo?jid=3093 (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
65 See supra note 62.
66 Francis, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D at 241 (Scheduling and Mediation Order).
67 Many of the facts related to the mediation and its aftermath may be gleaned from
the motions filed in the case, coupled with the court's order on a motion for
disqualification brought in Pitts v. Francis, No. 5:07cvl69-RS-EMT, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 93047 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 2007), in which the judge attempted to rebut, at some
length, allegations that he was prejudiced against Francis and effectively ordered him to
settle the Doe v. Francis case.
68 He concluded by inviting the opposing attorneys to fellate him, which, as
recounted by the plaintiffs in their sanctions motion, was "the only offer [Francis made]
that day." Motion for Sanctions, for Temporary Restraining Order, and to Compel at
para. 15, Francis, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D at 241.
69 Doe v. Francis, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 241, 241 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 8, 2003).
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exception to the Florida statutory mediation privilege. 70 The judge took the
position that there was no privilege, however, and at oral argument on the
sanctions motion, the day after the impasse, set a contempt hearing for the
following week.
The contempt hearing did not go well for Francis. After hearing evidence
suggesting that Francis had threatened violence at the mediation, the district
judge held Francis in indirect civil contempt pursuant to the court's powers
under Rule 16, and ordered coercive incarceration as a sanction.71 He then
suspended the order, moments before Francis was to be taken into custody, to
give Francis an opportunity to mediate in good faith over the following
weekend. The judge's order specifically dictated how Francis should behave,
and even what he should wear, at the purgative negotiation. 72 Mediation took
place the next day, with the court receiving regular updates from the
mediator regarding the progress of the negotiations.73 Late that afternoon the
attorneys for the two sides appeared in person at the judge's home, just
minutes before the expiration of the suspension of the contempt order, and
reported that a settlement offer had been extended, but the plaintiffs required
an additional session the following week to determine whether they could
apportion the lump sum among themselves. 74 Based on this representation,
the court lifted the contempt order.75
When the day of the follow-up mediation arrived, three days later, the
plaintiffs were able to reach an agreement among themselves regarding
apportionment, only to encounter additional conditions from the defendants
regarding payment over an extended period of time. 76 The plaintiffs moved
again for sanctions, and the judge reimposed his contempt order and directed
that Francis be taken into custody.77 Shortly after he surrendered himself,
70 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.405(4)(a)(2) (West 2010).
71 Francis at 1-2, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D at 241, Civil Minutes-General.
72 Id. at 2.
73 See Francis, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D at 241 (Order that Francis surrender to
custody of U.S. Marshal). Notably, and in contrast to some other jurisdictions, the local
rules for the Northern District of Florida make no allowance for such reports from the
mediator to the judge.
74 The author of this article was one of the attorneys present, and has firsthand
knowledge of what transpired.
7 Id.
76 Francis, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D at 241, Civil Minutes-General at 1.
77Id. at 2.
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Francis settled the case from his jail cell,78 only to be incarcerated for nearly
a year thereafter for issues that arose in the course of his contempt
detainment.79
Doe v. Francis may serve as an extreme example of what might go
wrong for a recalcitrant participant in court-ordered mediation, but it would
be incorrect to characterize the outcome as aberrational. Rather, Francis
relied on an established line of authority flowing from Heileman through the
court's sanctions order in Morgan's Foods,80 all of which gave the federal
courts the right to monitor good faith compliance with orders to mediate, and
concomitantly, the right to inquire regarding what was said at mediation.
Thus, one might surmise that the federal courts do not recognize any
protection of mediation confidentiality. As will be shown below, this
conclusion would be incorrect, and there is a large body of authority that
purports to exclude the sort of evidence that landed poor Francis in jail.
B. Protecting Mediation Confidentiality Under the Current Federal
Rules
Ironically, at the same time the federal courts were taking a more active
role in managing behaviors and outcomes in court-ordered mediations, they
ostensibly engaged in measures designed to protect the confidentiality of
78 A photograph of Francis signing the settlement agreement in his jail cell, along
with numerous other source documents related to the lawsuit and mediation, can be found
at the website on which Francis tells his version of what transpired,
www.meetjoefrancis.com. The author takes no position regarding the veracity of the
account on the web page.
79 Specifically, Francis was charged with bringing contraband, in the form of cash
and prescription medications, into the jail with him. These additional felony charges led
to the revocation of his bond in the state criminal case arising out of the same facts as the
federal civil case. Almost simultaneously, Francis was charged in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Nevada with federal income tax evasion, and he elected to be
transferred to Nevada for incarceration pending trial. Although the federal judge
indicated a willingness to allow release on bond, the Florida state court judge was not so
willing, and bonding out of jail in Nevada would have led only to another trip across
country to resume his jail time in Florida. Thus, Francis remained in jail in Nevada. With
the resolution of the Florida criminal charges through a plea agreement entered on March
13, 2008, Francis was released from jail after approximately ten months in custody. The
federal tax evasion charges were resolved by plea agreement in September, 2009.
80 The Morgan's Foods case was cited as authority in support of plaintiffs' motion
for sanctions. Supplemental Memorandum of Law Regarding Sanctions Under Rule 16,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 2, Doe v. Francis, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 241, 241
(N.D. Fla. Oct. 8, 2003).
730
[Vol. 25:3 2010]
IS IT TIME FOR A FEDERAL MEDIATION EXCLUSIONARY RULE?
those proceedings. These protections manifested themselves not only in the
local rules developed by the various district courts, but also in the decisions
of the courts on motions for sanctions brought by unhappy participants in
mandatory mediation. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the fruits of this uncoordinated
effort to address the issue of mediation privilege have been an inconsistent
and sometimes contradictory array of approaches, with a privilege that
appears robust in one jurisdiction but effaces into nonexistence in the next.
Such an outcome was largely a consequence of the ADR Act's district
court-based approach to crafting ADR rules. Although the Act appeared to
contemplate, and indeed invite,81 the creation of a rules-based uniform
mediation privilege at a later date, it directed as a short-term protection that
the district courts craft rules to "provide for the confidentiality of the
alternative dispute resolution processes and to prohibit disclosure of
confidential dispute resolution communications."8 2 As discussed below, in
the decade following the enactment of the ADR Act the various district
courts have responded to this mandate with a spectrum of devices that go
from expressly protecting mediation confidentiality to ignoring the issue
altogether.83 Some courts have complemented a rule-based solution by
recognizing a common law mediation privilege for policy-based reasons,84
even as other districts have found these same considerations insufficiently
compelling to support such a move.85 Still others have drawn a distinction
based on Erie v. Tompkins,86 and treated the question of mediation
confidentiality in diversity cases as a matter governed by state law.87 Thus,
the existence, source, and application of mediation confidentiality comprises
a crazy, lacunae-pocked quilt among the various districts and circuits that
comprise the federal judicial branch, providing no predictability to
81 At the same time, Congress stopped short of including a mediation confidentiality
provision in the ADR Act. This is noteworthy because, in other contexts, Congress has
expressly provided for the confidentiality of court-annexed ADR processes. See, e.g., 5
U.S.C. § 574 (2010) (setting forth confidentiality protections and exceptions under
Administrative ADR Act).
82 28 U.S.C. § 652(d) (2010).
83 See infra text accompanying notes 89-110.
84 See infra text accompanying notes 121-29.
85 See infra note 130.
86 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
87 See infra Part H.B.3.
731
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
participants in court-mandated mediation, and threatening the values
embodied in what is commonly recognized as the mediation process.88
1. Rules-Based Approaches to Mediation Confidentiality
As discussed previously in this article, the ADR Act of 1998 mandated
that federal district courts create local rules directed to the creation of
alternative dispute resolution processes. 89 In response to this direction, a
patchwork of largely inconsistent rules has emerged among the ninety-four
federal district courts.90 This lack of consistency, both internally within each
district court's rules and among the various district courts, makes the ADR
confidentiality regime in federal court a minefield for lawyers and their
clients. 91
The approaches of the various district courts to the issues of
confidentiality and good faith take many forms. A threshold question is one
of nomenclature: several district courts simply do not call their ADR process
"mediation," referring instead to generic ADR processes such as "settlement
conferences" that are conducted by a third-party neutral.92 One advantage of
this approach is that it avoids the confusion inherent in calling something
"mediation," which implies confidentiality, while at the same time imposing
good faith obligations on the parties and reporting requirements on the
neutral. Settlement conferences have never carried with them any notion of
confidentiality, and so it seems less likely that a proceeding so named will
lead to a surprise sanctions motion. At the same time, a settlement
conference entails an element of at least implicit compulsion that is
supposedly absent in mediation, and therefore increases the likelihood of an
agreement that is not entirely voluntary because of the threat of sanctions and
88 The potential for this situation was recognized not long after the passage of the
ADR Act. For a particularly prescient treatment of the issue, see Litt, supra note 31, at
1028-29.
89 28 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2010); see also supra text accompanying notes 27-31.
90 A complete appendix charting the defining characteristics of the ADR programs
of the ninety-four U.S. district courts, particularly as they pertain to confidentiality, duties
of good faith, and reporting requirements, follows at the conclusion of this article.
91 In addition, the lack of uniformity creates issues for litigants with cases in
multiple jurisdictions, raising the issue of whether a district judge in one jurisdiction must
or should apply the local confidentiality rule of the jurisdiction where the mediation took
place. See Litt, supra note 31, at 1032.
92 See, e.g., D. Wyo. R. 16.3 (referring to procedure bearing all indicia of mediation
as "settlement conference"); C.D. CAL. R. 16-15.4 (referring to "settlement proceedings"
moderated by an "Attorney Settlement Officer").
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the role of the judge, who may be the same person who tries the case, 93 as the
neutral.
Another variation among courts that have incorporated mandatory
mediation programs in their local rules 94 pertains to the source and scope of
the confidentiality they afford. Some, rather than drafting their own
confidentiality rules, have simply incorporated the mediation privilege of
their states.95 Others prevent the admission of evidence of statements made at
mediation in a subsequent trial, leaving open the possibility that a litigant
might use such evidence for some other purpose, such as a sanctions motion
or motion to enforce a mediation settlement agreement. 96 However, the
majority of district courts that have engrafted confidentiality protections into
their local ADR rules have provided broad protections that encompass not
only trial, but any subsequent proceeding.97
The tension in this confidentiality regime lies in the fact that most of the
same courts whose rules purport to protect statements and conduct at
mediation also impose rules-based good faith standards upon the participants.
The extent to which these two facets of their ADR programs, confidentiality
and a duty of good faith, can be harmonized turns to some degree on the
level of specificity with which the rules articulate what constitutes "good
faith." Many courts provide no explanation at all,98 or state simply that a
93 Many districts address this concern by having a magistrate judge or other judicial
officer preside at the settlement conference, instead of the trial judge. See, e.g., S.D. CAL.
Civ. R. 16.3(c) (disqualifying judicial officer who presides at settlement conference from
trying case); D. UTAH Civ. R. 16-2(j)(1), ADR Plan § 6(i)(2)(c) (providing for report of
violations of ADR program rules to compliance judge).
94 A significant number of district courts do not have mandatory mediation
programs as part of their local rules, including the District of New Mexico, the Eastern
District of California, and the district courts of Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
and Connecticut, among others.
95 See, e.g., S.D. FLA. R. 16.2(G)(2); N.D. IND. R. 16.6(c). Note also that some
courts treat the issue as one of state law only where jurisdiction is based on diversity. See
infra Part II(B)(3).
96 See, e.g., D. NEB. GEN. R. 1.2(h), Mediation Plan R. 4(e).
97 See, e.g., D. UTAH Civ. R. 16-2(g), ADR Plan § 3; D. D.C. R. 84.9; D. KAN. R.
16.3(i); W.D. TEx. R. CV-88(i).
98 See, e.g., S.D. OHIO CIV. R. 16.3(e)(4) (imposing obligation to attend mediation in
good faith); D. HAW. R. 88.1(f) ("[the] [p]arties shall meaningfully participate in any
mediation submitted under this rule."); S.D. ALA. R. 16.6 ("A judge of the court may
order parties to participate in good faith [in ADR] procedures ... ); W.D.N.Y.
PROPOSED R. 16.2-1(1), available at http://www.nywd.uscourts.gov/document/-
ProposedLR. 1-1 -08.pdf ("Parties and counsel shall participate in good faith, without time
constraints, and put forth their best efforts toward settlement.").
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party has an obligation to participate meaningfully in the mediation
process. 99 The fact that these same courts often require a mediator to report
back to the judge regarding whether this amorphous standard was satisfiedl00
implies that, even here, reconciling mediation confidentiality and a duty of
good faith is problematic at best. 101
The most glaring inconsistency between guaranteeing confidentiality and
monitoring good faith lies in those rules that purport to define good faith
specifically. For instance, a significant number of district courts require
litigants to submit written memoranda to the mediator in advance of a
mediation session.102 If the same court provides that statements in mediation
are confidential, may the mediator report a party's failure to submit such a
memorandum? 03 What about a memorandum that contains a perfunctory
analysis, or what the mediator later concludes was a material misstatement
that went beyond "puffing?" It is also common for courts with mandatory
mediation rules to insist that a party representative appear with "full authority
to settle. . . ."104 This, in turn, may be defined in detail under the rules, 05 or
left open to the understanding of the parties, the mediator, or ultimately the
trial judge.106 Regardless, it is manifest that one cannot articulate a basis for
sanctions without stating what was communicated at mediation regarding a
party representative's settlement authority, which in turn seems inconsistent
with preserving confidentiality.
99 See, e.g., D. HAW. R. 88.1(f); D.N.J. CIv. R. App. Q(III).
100 See, e.g., D. HAw R. 88.1(h); S.D. OHIO Civ. R. (FAQ "What to Expect from
Mediation," available at http://www.ohsd.uscourts.gov/mediation/faq.html); N.D. Ala. R.
16.1, ADR Plan R. IV(B)(9)(g); W.D.N.Y. PROPOSED R. 16.2-1(n)(4)(B).
101 One pair of authors has referred to this tension between mediation's ostensible
confidentiality and the duty to report back to the court regarding perceived breaches of
good faith as a case of "process dissonance." See Izumi & La Rue, supra note 43, at 68.
102 See, e.g., D. WYo. R. 16.3(c)(2)(i); N.D. GA. R. 16.7(H); S.D.N.Y. R. 83.12(i);
E.D. PA. R. 53.3, Court-Annexed Mediation Protocol R. 17, available at
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/locrules/civil/mediation/medpr533.pdf; S.D.
OHIO Civ. R. (FAQ "What to Expect from Mediation," available at
http://www.ohsd.uscourts.gov/mediation/faq.html).
103 Apparently so. See Nick v. Morgan's Foods, Inc., 270 F.3d 590, 596-97 (8th Cir.
2001) (sanctioning a party for, inter alia, failure to submit a pre-mediation
memorandum).
104 See, e.g., D. Miss. UNIF. R. 83.7(G)(2).
105 See, e.g., D. MoNT. R. 16.6(b)(4)(a); N.D. GA. R. 16.7(I)(1).
106 See generally, S.D. FLA. R. 16.2(E) (requiring attendance by representative
"with full authority to negotiate a settlement," without further definition or explanation).
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Any notion of mediation privilege or confidentiality founders completely
where district courts have imposed specific communications obligations on
the participants and a duty to comply in good faith. For instance, the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia provides a list of questions
regarding the case that a party or attorney must be prepared to answer for the
mediator. What if the attorney demurs? 107 The District of Nebraska goes
further, requiring broad communications by the parties and allowing
extensive communication between the mediator and the judge, while
simultaneously purporting to protect mediation confidentiality. 08
What has emerged in the last decade, in response to the mandate of the
ADR Act, has been the adoption of ninety-four different versions of an
alternative dispute resolution program. Some have dealt with mediation
specifically, while others have not. 109 Some create an expectation of
confidentiality, even while imposing a duty of good faith and an obligation
for the mediator to provide specific information to the court regarding what
transpired at mediation.I10 For the most part the district court ADR regimes
are inconsistent with each other, and often cannot be harmonized with the
local state law addressing mediation confidentiality. As a means of protecting
mediation confidentiality they generally have failed, undermining the
mediation process as a result.
In light of this incongruity between rules that, on the one hand, allow a
district judge to evaluate what transpired at mediation, while on the other
hand ostensibly protecting the confidentiality of the mediation process, it is
perhaps unsurprising that both sides in the GGW mediation proceeded from a
faulty premise as they argued the merits of the sanctions motion. A review of
the motion itself, as well as the evidence presented at the hearing,
demonstrates that counsel on both sides viewed the issue of confidentiality as
governed by Florida law."I' Thus, because Florida recognizes an exception to
107 See, e.g., N.D. GA. R. 16.7(H). The district court's rules provide a twist,
however, insofar as the confidentiality provision only allows an exception if the district
judge asks for a report on the proceedings. N.D. GA. R. 16.7(I)(5). Whether a party or
mediator runs afoul of this protection by filing or providing an affidavit in support of a
sanctions motion is not clearly addressed by the rule.
108 See, e.g., D. NEB. GEN. R. 1.2(h), Mediation Plan R. 4(G) (directing that
mediator report to court "any actions or omissions by any of the [parties] which, in the
opinion of the mediator, may violate the terms of the Mediation Reference Order or this
Plan.").
109 See supra note 94.
110 See supra note 100.
Ill Defendants Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Sanctions, Temporary Restraining Order, and to Compel [Defendant's Memorandum],
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mediation confidentiality for threats of violence,' 12 the issue framed by the
parties was whether Francis's threat to "bury" plaintiffs' counsel constituted
more than a figure of speech,113 and could be construed in context as a
physical threat against the attorneys in the room. This led the plaintiffs to
present evidence at the contempt hearing suggesting Francis's demeanor
indicated that he meant for his words to be construed as a threat of violence,
and that physical blows appeared imminent as the words were spoken.114 It
was only on the final day of proceedings that the plaintiffs first raised the
argument that the judge was empowered by Rule 16 to impose sanctions, and
it was on this basis, and not the Florida "threat of violence" exception, that
the judge ultimately based his contempt citation.' 1 5
Moreover, the confusion arising out of the disparate treatment of
mediation privilege among the federal courts has created a potential source of
liability for parties who seek to rely upon mediation communications for
some purpose other than sanctions. For instance, In re Anonymousl16
presented the question of whether an attorney could be sanctioned for
disclosing confidential mediation communications in the course of arbitrating
a fee dispute. Under the local rules governing ADR, information disclosed at
mediation was to be kept strictly confidential.1 17 Notwithstanding, an
attorney who participated in a court-ordered mediation revealed information
related to the mediation in a fee arbitration proceeding, ostensibly in
response to previous disclosures by his former client, and all found
Doe v. Francis, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 241, 241 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 8, 2003).
Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions, for Protective
Order, and to Compel [Plaintiffs Memorandum], Francis, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D at
241.
112 There is very little reported case law as to what constitutes a "threat of violence,"
although this exception is recognized in most jurisdictions and under the Uniform
Mediation Act. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 44.405(4)(a)(2) (2010); UNIF. MEDIATION ACT
§ 6(a)(3) (2001).
113 On this point, the author unsuccessfully argued to the judge that the threat could
not be taken literally, because Francis was not "holding a shovel" when he made the
statement. Defendant's Memorandum at 8, Francis, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D at 241.
Humor is always a risky tactic with an angry federal judge, and it did not carry the day
here.
114 Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing Held on March 30, 2007 Before Judge
Richard Smoak, at 12-13, Francis, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D at 241.
115 Supplemental Memorandum Regarding Sanctions Under Rule 16, Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, Francis, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D at 241.
116 In re Anonymous, 283 F.3d 627 (4th Cir. 2002).
117 Id. at 632 (quoting 4TH CIR. R. 33).
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themselves hailed before the circuit's Standing Panel on Attorney Discipline.
Although the appellate court determined the disclosures violated the local
confidentiality rule, it elected not to sanction the parties because the
violations were neither intentional nor in bad faith, and the harm was
minimal. 118 By analogy, one might expect that the mediation confidentiality
conferred by local rule or by common law would prevent sanctions motions
that disclose communications which are clearly within the rule of
confidentiality. In most, but not all, cases the confidentiality rule does not
recognize an exception for motions for sanctions based on an alleged failure
to mediate in good faith.119 As with the attorney in In re Anonymous,
however, litigants increasingly have sought sanctions with motions that rely
upon confidential mediation communications, sometimes obtaining an order
awarding sanctions and sometimes being sanctioned themselves for their
disclosures.120 The confusion lies in the courts' inconsistent treatment of the
express protections they have conferred, beginning with the dissonance
between attempts to define a mediation privilege through the common law,
by statute, or in accordance with local state law.
2. Common Law Recognition ofa Federal Mediation Privilege
Numerous federal courts have considered the recognition of a federal,
common law mediation privilege, but the results are impossible to reconcile.
While some district courts apply a generic analysis to the issue of whether to
recognize a mediation privilege,121 others look to the interplay between their
own local rules and the ADR Act's guidance on mediation confidentiality,' 22
often reaching contradictory results. Still other analyses have turned on the
issue of whether the question presented is one of state or federal law,123
raising the possibility of mediation privilege extending to some but not all
evidence in the same lawsuit. The results are, in sum, varied and inconsistent.
Some federal courts have simply recognized the existence of a common
law mediation privilege. Among those recognizing the existence of a
118 Id. at 635-36.
119 Those that do recognize such an exception include D. NEB. GEN. R. 1.2(h),
Mediation Plan R. 4(g); N.D.N.Y. R. 83.11-5(d)(3); and W.D.N.Y. PROPOSED R. 16.2-
1(n)(4)(B).
120 See infra text accompanying note 190; Coben & Thompson, supra note 60, at
122-23.
121 See infra text accompanying notes 124-28.
122 See infra text accompanying notes 132-36.
123 See infra text accompanying notes 143-60.
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privilege, most analyzed the question by way of Federal Rule of Evidence
501, which allows the creation or recognition of a privilege as a matter of
federal common law where warranted "in the light of reason and
experience." 24 For instance, in the case In re RDM,125 the bankruptcy judge
determined that a federal mediation privilege protected certain documents
exchanged at two mediations. The court applied the generic rubric in Jaffee
v. Redmondl26 to determine whether to recognize a privilege, considering
(1) whether the asserted privilege is 'rooted in the imperative need for
confidence and trust'; (2) whether the privilege would serve public ends; (3)
whether the evidentiary detriment caused by the exercise of the privilege is
modest; and (4) whether the denial of the federal privilege would frustrate a
parallel privilege adopted by the states. 127
In applying these factors to recognize a mediation privilege, the In re RDM
court observed that protecting the confidentiality of mediation actually
furthered the goal of docket management, insofar as a lack of such
protections would inhibit parties from revealing sensitive information,
therefore making settlement less likely, or leading them to refuse to
participate altogether. 128
At least a handful of federal courts have recognized the existence of a
federal, common law mediation privilege. 129 Not all agree on this point,
however.130 Some, when faced with the question of whether to recognize a
mediation privilege, have decided that the issue need not be decided in the
case before the court. 131 Still others have drawn a distinction between a rule
of confidentiality, which is routinely provided in their local ADR rules, and a
124 FED. R. EvID. 501.
125 In re RDM Sports Group, Inc., 277 B.R. 415, 425-31 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2002).
126 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10-17 (1996).
127 In re RDM, 277 B.R. at 427 (quoting Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension &
Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1171 (C.D. Cal. 1998)).
128 In re RDM, 277 B.R. at 427-28.
129 Sheldone v. Pa. Tpk. Comm'n., 104 F. Supp. 2d 511, 512-18 (W.D. Pa. 2000);
Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1170-80; see also Alan Kirtley, The Mediation Privilege's
Transition from Theory to Implementation: Designing a Mediation Privilege Standard to
Protect Mediation Participants, the Process and the Public Interest, 1995 J. DisP. RESOL.
1.
130 See, e.g., Babasa v. Lenscrafters, Inc., 498 F.3d 972, 974-75 (9th Cir. 2007)
(declining to reach issue of whether to recognize federal mediation privilege); Dusek v.
Mattel Inc., 141 F. App'x 586, 588 n.2 (9th Cir. 2005) (same).
131 See supra note 130.
738
[Vol. 25:3 2010]
IS IT TIME FOR A FEDERAL MEDIATION EXCLUSIONARY RULE?
privilege that would protect any mediation communications from not only
disclosure but discovery. These courts tend to eschew the Jaffee analysis
altogether and look to the ADR Act and their own local rules to ascertain
whether a mediation privilege may be implied from the local rules'
confidentiality protections.
For instance, in FDIC v. White,132 the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Texas rejected an argument by the FDIC that a
mediation privilege was implied by the language in the ADR Act1 33 that
directs that federal courts implement rules to protect mediation
confidentiality. The issue before the court in White was whether to consider
evidence of duress in procuring a mediated settlement agreement that the
FDIC had moved to enforce; the nonmovant defendants sought to offer
evidence of events at mediation that constituted duress. In concluding no
mediation privilege applied, the White court drew a distinction between
confidentiality, which was specifically addressed in the ADR Act, and
privilege, which was not. 134 The trial judge concluded that to recognize a
mediation privilege "would effectively bar a party from raising well-
established common law defenses such as fraud, duress, coercion, and mutual
mistake," and observed that it was unlikely Congress intended such a
"draconian result."l 35 Notably, the court reached its conclusion with no
mention at all of the Jaffee factors, and notwithstanding not only a local rule
that ostensibly protected the confidentiality of mediation, but also provisions
related to mediation confidentiality in the referring order.136
While not directly addressing the possibility of a federal common law
mediation privilege, the district court in EEOC v. Northlake Foods, Inc.,137
reached a seemingly contradictory result based on the same criteria. In
Northlake, the EEOC sought to disclose the monetary amount set forth in a
confidential mediation settlement agreement between an employer and an
allegedly sexually harassed employee. The employer moved for a protective
order, relying on a local rule that provided proceedings and statements at
mediation were "privileged in all respects."' 38 In deciding that the settlement
agreement was confidential, and therefore not subject to disclosure, the
132 FDIC v. White, 76 F. Supp. 2d 736 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
133 See supra text accompanying notes 27-30.
134 FDIC v. White, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 738.
13 5 Id.
136 Id. at 737.
137 EEOC v. Northlake Foods, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 2d 1366 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
138 Id. at 1367; see also M.D. FLA. R. 9.07(b).
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district judge relied not only on the above-referenced local rule, but also on
the ADR Act's confidentiality mandate.139 Although the author would
suggest that Northlake Foods was incorrectly decided in any event, insofar as
it would extend a rule of mediation confidentiality or privilege to a
settlement agreement rather than the mediation itself, it manifestly cannot be
reconciled with White. Moreover, the reasoning in both cases bears no
resemblance to that in RDM or the other privilege cases, as neither mentions
the Jaffee factors or a generic privilege analysis.
The potential recognition of a federal, common law mediation privilege
presents at least three significant uniformity challenges. First, as illustrated
above, a piecemeal Jaffee analysis by each district or circuit court to consider
the issue has already produced inconsistent outcomes from district to district.
Thus, one encounters the same problems of uniformity created by the
patchwork of local district court rules created pursuant to the ADR Act,140
and the existence of a privilege turns upon which court referred the matter to
mediation.
The second uniformity issue relates to the scope of the privilege
conferred. For instance, at least one circuit has recognized the existence of a
federal common law privilege that extends to settlement negotiations
generally, rather than just mediation. 141 There is also disparate guidance
regarding the coextensiveness of the concepts of "confidentiality" and
"privilege," and whether a mediation privilege applies only to matters related
to the dispute, or mediation generally.142 Finally, as discussed below, there is
139 Northlake, 411 F. Supp. 2d at 1367-68 n.2.
140 See supra discussion accompanying notes 81-88.
141 See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976,
979-83 (6th Cir. 2003). This privilege has been largely rejected by other courts that have
considered the issue. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Mediatek, Inc., No.
C-05-3148 MMC (JCS) (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2007) (order granting in part and denying in
part plaintiff s motion for leave, denying motion for reconsideration, and denying motion
for stay); JZ Buckingham Invs. LLC v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 15, 23-24 (2007);
Heartland Surgical Specialty Hosp., LLC v. Midwest Div., Inc., No. 05-2164-MLB-
DWB (D. Kan. Apr. 27, 2007) (memorandum and order); In re Subpoena Issued to
CFTC, 370 F. Supp. 2d 201, 207-12 (D. D.C. 2005). In fact, even the district courts
within the Sixth Circuit have expressed reservations about the existence of such a
privilege. See Grupo Condumex v. SPX Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 623, 629 n.3 (N.D. Ohio
2004) (expressing "misgivings" regarding settlement privilege in Goodyear, particularly
in light of fact that it was a diversity case).
142 See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 283 F.3d 627, 633 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting
argument that privilege only extended to matters related to dispute).
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a problem of uniformity arising out of the basis for the district court's
jurisdiction and the nature of the issue to which the privilege might apply.
3. State Law Privilege Rules in Federal Court
Adding to the confusion, some courts have taken the position that in
cases brought under diversity jurisdiction, the existence and scope of a
mediation privilege is governed by state law. 143 For example, in Mutual of
Enumclaw v. Cornhusker Casualty Insurance Co.,'" the district court
presiding in an insurance bad faith case considered a motion for a protective
order brought by an insurance company to prevent disclosure of statements
made by its representative in the mediation of the underlying bodily injury
action. Because the court's jurisdiction was based on diversity, and the
dispute was governed by Washington law, the trial judge concluded that the
Uniform Mediation Act (UMA) as adopted in Washington governed the
matter of privilege. 145 Just as the carrier perhaps thought it had prevailed on
its argument for a protective order, given the UMA's broad privilege, the
judge went on to conclude that the privilege did not apply to the statement
because the underlying dispute was related to personal injury damages, rather
than coverage, and the privilege only extended to statements that "pertain[ed]
to the mediated dispute." 46
Not all federal courts see the source of their jurisdiction as relevant to the
applicability of state mediation law, however. For instance, in Olam v.
Congress Mortgage Co.,147 Judge Brazil of the Northern District of
143 For a discussion of the problem of vertical choice of law in the application of
mediation privilege in federal court, see generally Ellen E. Deason, Predictable
Mediation Confidentiality in the US. Federal System, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL.
239, 252-59 (2002).
144 Mut. of Enumclaw v. Cornbusker Cas. Ins. Co., No. CV-07-3101-FVS (E.D.
Wash. Sept. 16, 2008) (order denying defendant's motion for a protective order re:
mediation communications).
145 Id. at 2.
146 Id. at 3. The trial judge managed this feat by noting that a "mediation
communication" is defined as "a statement, whether by [sic] oral or in a record or verbal
or nonverbal, that occurs during a mediation or is made for purposes of considering,
conducting, participating in, initiating, continuing, or reconvening a mediation or
retaining a mediator." Id. (quoting WASH. REv. CODE § 7.07.010(2)). In turn, "mediation"
is defined as "a process in which a mediator facilitates communications and negotiation
between parties to assist them in reaching a voluntary agreement regarding their
dispute." Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 7.07.010(1)).
147 Olam v. Cong. Mortg. Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
741
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
California reasoned that because the issue presented in a motion to enforce a
mediation settlement agreement was one of state law, specifically contract,
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 directed that California law148 governed the
issue of mediation confidentiality. This was despite the fact that the
underlying claim was based, in part, on alleged violations of the federal
Truth-in-Lending Act.149 Judge Brazil anticipated the very issue raised in this
article, reasoning that when Congress did not include an express
confidentiality protection in the ADR Act of 1998, it:
[F]oreseeably left open the substantial possibility that there would be
considerable differences between the local rules different courts adopted
(and that a considerable period would elapse before all 94 district courts had
rules in place directed to this matter). It is not likely that Congress intended
to give 94 district courts the power to vary in potentially quite different
ways the proviso in Rule 501.150
Judge Brazil's observation foreshadowed the inconsistent approaches to
mediation privilege that would emerge among the federal courts in the
decade that followed, and he saw the recognition of state mediation privilege
law as a means of providing at least a consistent methodology for predicting
how courts would decide such issues. At the same time, the reasoning in
Olam is limited in its application, insofar as the question presented related to
the enforcement of a mediation settlement agreement, essentially a contract
question.' 5 ' What of the motion to sanction a party for supposed misconduct
at mediation? Although issues of contract may come into play in such
situations, it seems far more likely that the movant's reasoning would rely on
148 Specifically, CAL. EvID. CODE § 1119 (West 2010).
149 Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1115.
15 0 Id. at 1123.
151 At least one court has enforced a state mediation privilege to prevent evidence at
a grand jury proceeding of communications in a prior state court-annexed mediation. In
United States v. Gullo, 672 F. Supp. 99, 99 (W.D.N.Y. 1987), the defendant was charged
by a federal grand jury with extortion in collecting or attempting to collect an extension
of credit. The indictment allegedly relied, in part, on communications during a state
dispute resolution process that was covered by a state rule of confidentiality, New York
Judiciary Law 849-g(6). Id. at 102. The privilege was included in a state ADR process
designed to resolve informally certain criminal matters. Id. at 102-03. Applying the four
Jaffee factors as articulated in United States v. King, 73 F.R.D. 103, 105-09 (E.D.N.Y.
1976), the district court found that it must recognize the privilege, although (or perhaps
because) it made no difference in the outcome of the case. Gullo, 672 F. Supp. at 104; see
also Joshua P. Rosenberg, Keeping the Lid on Confidentiality: Mediation Privilege and
Conflict ofLaws, 10 Omo ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 157, 175-78 (1994) (analyzing Gullo).
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FRCP Rule 16 or the court's inherent authority to enforce its mediation
order. Olam would therefore provide no refuge for the nonmovant seeking to
exclude evidence of allegedly sanctionable statements or conduct, given that
the rule of decision would invariably be federal.
Other courts have similarly drawn a distinction regarding the existence of
a mediation or settlement privilege based not on Erie considerations, but
rather the nature of the issue to which the otherwise privileged information
would apply. For example, in Babasa v. Lenscraftersl52 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals considered the basis and scope of a purported mediation
privilege argued by a defendant seeking to protect a letter written by
plaintiff's counsel a year earlier. If the letter was protected by a privilege, in
this case the California statutory mediation privilege, 153 the defendant argued
that it could not serve as a basis for the district court to conclude the
defendant had been put on notice that the amount in controversy was
sufficient to invoke federal diversity jurisdiction and remove the case. 154 The
Babasa court rejected this argument, observing that under Federal Rule of
Evidence 501 "privileges provided by state law apply in civil actions only
Wih respect to an element of a claim or defense to whic State law
supplies the rule of decision."'"55 Because the question of jurisdiction was
governed by federal law, the circuit court reasoned that the California
mediation privilege did not bar consideration of the letter to determine when
the defendant had notice of the amount in controversy.156
By similar reasoning, the district court in Folb v. Motion Picture Industry
Pension & Health Plans1 57 recognized and applied a federal mediation
privilege in a case involving both a federal ERISA question and pendent state
law claims. The plaintiff in Folb sought a letter prepared for a mediation
between the defendant and a woman who had sued defendant for alleged
sexual harassment. Presumably, the letter would have been relevant both to
state law contractual claims and a federal whistleblower claim under ERISA.
In determining that federal law controlled the issue of privilege, the Folb
152 Babasa v. Lenscrafters, Inc., 498 F.3d 972, 974 (9th Cir. 2007).
153 CAL. EvID. CODE § 1119 (West 2010).
154 Babasa, 498 F.3d at 974. For a discussion of the use of such demand letters as a
basis for diversity jurisdiction, see generally Michael P. Dickey, Demand Letters and
Diversity Jurisdiction, 14 CoM. Tn. EvID. 4 (2006).
155 Babasa, 498 F.3d at 974 (quoting FED. R. EvID. 501).
156 Id. at 974-75. The Babasa court did not, however, decide whether the California
mediation privilege was sufficiently broad to extend to the letter, or whether to consider
the recognition of a federal mediation privilege. Id.
157 Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1170-80.
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court applied established precedent for the premise that where both federal
and state law provided the rules of decision, because of the existence of
pendent claims, federal mediation law should control.' 58 It then applied the
Jaffeel59 factors to the question of whether to recognize a federal mediation
privilege, and ultimately elected to do so. 160
As discussed above, the reasoning in Olam, Babasa, and Folb suggests
that a common law mediation privilege would likely apply to
communications used as a basis for a post-mediation sanctions motion,
although this is by no means certain. The question of whether a district court
may sanction a party for mediation misconduct is surely one of federal law,
whether the court is relying upon rules-based authority or its inherent
authority as contemplated under Heileman. At the same time, one may fairly
question whether the common law, rather than a formal rule, can prevent a
district judge from enforcing a local rule of procedure, in particular a local
rule providing standards of conduct for ADR. Moreover, it is difficult to
imagine that a common law privilege can satisfy the requirement under
Jaffee that it serve public ends, 161 insofar as those ends are embodied in the
rules the common law privilege would circumscribe. Thus, the most likely
result of recognizing a federal common law mediation privilege is that it
would fail to extend to evidence offered in support of sanctions motions
arising out of mediation. As discussed below,162 the proliferation of such
motions in recent years provides the strongest basis for recognizing the
privilege in the first place, and so a common law privilege would fall short of
its purpose.
III. THE EXPLOSION OF "GOOD FAITH" LITIGATION
Although not unknown prior to the enactment of the ADR Act of 1998,
motion practice related to mediation since that time has expanded greatly.163
Many of these motions are based on issues unrelated to statements or conduct
after the mediation has commenced, most commonly the failure of a party to
158 Id. at 1169-70. The court also rejected the magistrate's conclusion that comity
dictated the application of state law. Id.
159 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10-17 (1996).
160 Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164,
1180 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
161 Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11.
162 See infra Part V(A).
163 See Coben & Thompson, supra note 60, at 48, 51-52.
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appear at all,164 or to appear with adequate authority to settle.165 These sorts
of disputes would not be affected directly by the imposition of a mediation
privilege, 166 because the facts giving rise to the sanctions motion would not
rely on statements made during mediation negotiations.
On the other hand, the years since the passage of the ADR Act have seen
a growth in a new type of sanctions motion, based not on a party's failure to
appear at all, but rather upon what is said or what transpires once the
mediation begins. For instance, in Smith Wholesale Co., Inc., v. Philip
Morris USA Inc.,167 the district court considered a motion to vacate sanctions
imposed for Philip Morris's alleged bad faith participation in a mediation.
Although the judge ultimately elected to vacate the order, it is noteworthy
that the basis for the motion was an assertion regarding Philip Morris's
mediation negotiating posture, specifically its unwillingness to negotiate
164 See, e.g., Am. Appraisal Assoc., Inc. v. Am. Appraisals, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 2d
1353, 1355-56 (S.D. Fla. 2008); Davis v. Lane Mgmt., LLC., 524 F. Supp. 2d 1375,
1378 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
165 See, e.g., Negron v. Woodhull Hosp., 173. F. App'x 77, 79 (2d. Cir. 2006)
(vacating sanctions award for failure to bring principal to mediation with full authority to
settle); Nick v. Morgan's Foods, Inc., 270 F.3d 590, 597 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirming
sanctions award based in part on sending representative with only $500 in settlement
authority); Scaife v. Assoc. Air Ctr., Inc., 100 F.3d 406, 412 (5th Cir. 1996) (affirming in
part sanctions award against attorney for violating mediation order that directed
attendance by party with full authority to settle); TR v. St. Johns County Sch. Dist., No.
3:07-cv-913-J-33MCR, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59272 (M.D. Fla. July 28, 2008) (order
denying sanctions motion based on school district representative's need to obtain consent
of school board as condition of mediation settlement); Hijeck v. Menlo Logistics, Inc.,
No. 3-07-CV-0530-G, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90590 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2007)
(memorandum order denying motion that argued for sanctions against defendant for
having human resources manager, rather than executive, appear at mediation); Those
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. GMC Land Servs., Inc., No. 06-60325--CIV,
2007 WL 3306964 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (denying sanctions motion against defendant for
bringing claims representative with inadequate settlement authority to mediation).
166 At the same time, sanctions motions for failure to appear, or failure to appear
with adequate settlement authority, sometimes disclose detailed information regarding
mediation negotiations that would otherwise be protected by local confidentiality rules.
See, e.g., Performance Chevrolet, Inc. v. Mkt. Scan Info. Sys., Inc., No. CVO4-244-S-
BLW, 2005 WL 1768650 (D. Idaho July 25, 2005) (order granting motion for sanctions
for failure to send representative with full authority to settle, including detailed
description of parties' opening statements at mediation, and terms of settlement offer
extended by plaintiff).
167 Smith Wholesale Co., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., No. 2:03-CV-221, 2005
WL 2030655 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 23, 2005) (memorandum opinion and order).
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regarding changes to a wholesale program. 168 Neither side appears to have
argued that evidence of Philip Morris's refusal to negotiate regarding this
issue was confidential, given a local rule in that district barring the parties
from making the mediation proceedings "known to the Presiding Judge." 69
Litigants have also tested the waters by filing motions for sanctions
based on the failure to make a good faith offer at mediation. Although these
motions appear rarely to succeed,170 they illustrate the tension between rules
supposedly conferring mediation confidentiality and the trial courts'
purported inherent authority to monitor good faith compliance with a
mediation referral order.17' In Nevada Partners Fund, LLC v. United
States,172 plaintiffs brought a motion for sanctions because the defendant
failed to make an offer at mediation in excess of what had been proposed in
negotiations beforehand. The court did not impose sanctions, reasoning that
although it had the inherent authority to sanction bad faith at mediation, the
imposition of sanctions for failure to make an offer could be construed as
coercion to settle.173 Once again, the trial judge did not mention the fact that
the local rules of the Southern District of Mississippi expressly provide that
parties may not communicate to the court regarding "any communication
made, position taken, or opinion formed by any party or neutral in
connection with mediation proceedings." 74
168 Id. at 2.
169 E.D. TENN. R. 16.4(h).
170 "Rarely" does not mean "never," however. For example, in Ferrero v.
Henderson, No. C-3-00-462, 2003 WL 21796381 (S.D. Ohio June 24, 2003), the district
judge "sustained" a motion for sanctions brought by an employment discrimination
plaintiff who claimed her former employer acted in bad faith by refusing to make a
monetary settlement offer at mediation. The motion sets forth in detail what transpired at
mediation, apparently relying on an exception to the local ADR rules allowing disclosure
of confidential mediation communications "in connection with possible sanctions for
misconduct...." Id. at 5; see also S.D. OHIO Civ. R. 16.3(c)(3)(C). Even this, however,
requires a determination of necessity by a judicial officer before the exception may be
invoked. Id.
171 For another example of a failed sanctions motion based on the failure to make a
settlement offer, see Hamlett v. Gonzales, No. Civ.A. 303CV2202BHM, 2005 WL
1500819 (N.D. Tex. June 15, 2005) (memorandum opinion and order denying motion for
sanctions for making alleged nominal offer, based in part on movant's violation of
confidentiality protections in district court's local rules).
172 Nev. Partners Fund, LLC v. United States, No. 3:06cv379-HTW-MTP (S.D.
Miss. Jan 16, 2009) (order on motion for sanctions).
173 Id. at 1.
174 D. Miss. UNIF. R. 83.7(K)(3).
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The most egregious among this growing body of filings are motions
seeking sanctions based on a detailed recounting of supposedly confidential
mediation proceedings, often in an effort to portray a negotiation strategy as
"bad faith" by the opposing party. A failed sanctions effort along these lines
was advanced in Damon v. UPS,175 wherein a plaintiff sought sanctions
against a defendant based on the fact that the defendant "shifted ground" and
"derailed the process" in a third mediation session.176 Although the motion
was ultimately denied, it is difficult to imagine why this information was not
treated as confidential in light of the district court's local rules.177
Perhaps the most chilling sanctions order of this new genre was entered
by a magistrate judge of the Western District of New York in Fisher v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp.,'78 a personal injury case arising out of the side
effects of the prescription drug Paxil. Following an unsuccessful, court-
ordered mediation, the plaintiffs filed a motion for sanctions against
defendant for failing to mediate in good faith as mandated by the local
rules.179 The alleged offense? Apparently, defense counsel filed a motion for
summary judgment on the day prior to the mediation, while plaintiffs' lead
counsel was enroute from New Orleans to Buffalo and unable to review and
analyze the motion.180 Once at the mediation, which the defendant (but not
defense counsel) attended by phone, defense counsel presented a copy of the
motion, and stated that there would be no offers in excess of $1,000 until the
plaintiffs explained why the motion's statute of limitations argument was
incorrect.181 Roughly three weeks later the plaintiffs moved for sanctions,
detailing what transpired at the mediation.
As one might expect, the defendant argued that the motion for sanctions
should never have been filed, noting that the local ADR Rules rendered the
mediation confidential,182 and only allowed the mediator, rather than the
175 Damon v. UPS, No. 04-CV-746S (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2009) (decision and order).
176 Id. at 1.
177 W.D.N.Y. PROPOSED R. 16.2-1(n). The rule does, however, provide an
exception for the mediator to disclose whatever he perceives to be a failure to participate
in good faith, which is both mandated and broadly defined under the local rules. Id. at
16.2-l(n)(4).
178 Fisher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 07-CV-0347A(F), 2008 WL 4501860
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2008) (decision and order).
179 Id. at 2; see also W.D.N.Y. ADR PLAN § 5.8(G).
180 Fisher, No. 07-CV-0347A(F), at 2.
181 Id. at 3. The fact that the mediation ended in an impasse suggests the plaintiffs'
answer on this point was inadequate to cause the defendant to materially raise its offer.
182 Id.; see also W.D.N.Y. PROPOSED R. 16.2-l(n)(4)(B).
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parties, to report misconduct at the mediation. The magistrate observed that
the confidentiality rule had been changed after the mediation (and, for that
matter, after the sanctions motion was filed), but before his ruling, and in its
current form allowed parties to report violation of the ADR Plan to the
court.183 The judge also relied on 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which allowed courts to
impose cost sanctions on vexatious attorneys. Once the judge reasoned that
the rules allowed the court to consider this evidence and to impose sanctions,
he ruled that the negotiating tactic of refusing to raise the defendant's
settlement offer until plaintiffs' counsel countered the defendant's statute of
limitations argument constituted bad faith in violation of the local ADR
rules.184 So too was the discourtesy of filing a motion for summary judgment
while plaintiffs' counsel was on a flight to attend the mediation, leaving
counsel unable to analyze the issues raised in advance of the mediation. 185
The magistrate therefore awarded sanctions including over thirty hours of
attorney time, plus fees and costs, against both defendant and its attorney.' 8 6
Among the growing mass of sanctions litigation in the federal courts
related to alleged mediation misconduct,187 Fisher stands out as particularly
troubling. The magistrate judge imposed sanctions for the filing of a
summary judgment motion the day before the mediation, although the filing
of a dispositive motion on the threshold of a court-ordered mediation is so
commonplace in civil litigation that the failure to do so, particularly by a
large company represented by a very big law firm,188 would have been the
more surprising tactic. Apparently, the judge focused on the fact that
opposing counsel was in the air at the time, and could not read it. Still, the
facts in the motion could not have come as a surprise, particularly after
nearly eighteen months of litigation. The nexus the judge required to turn this
183 Fisher, No. 07-CV-0347A(F), at 4.
184 Fisher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 07-CV-0347A(F), at 5, 2008 WL
4501860 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2008).
185 Id. The magistrate judge conceded, however, that the statute of limitations had
been raised as an affirmative defense at the time the case was filed, but dismissed this as
"boilerplate." Id. at 6.
'
86 Id. at 7.
187 See Outar v. Greno Indus., Inc., No. 03-CV-0916, at 2, 2005 WL 2387840
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005) (sanctioning plaintiff for violating mediation order by
"[i]gnoring advice, cajoling, and common sense" in his conduct at mediation); Nick v.
Morgan's Foods, Inc., 270 F.3d 590, 597 (8th Cir. 2001) (sanctioning defendant for
failure to submit a mediation statement or memorandum as ordered by the court).
188 SmithKline Beecham was represented in the litigation by King & Spalding, a
national law firm based in Atlanta. See Fisher, No. 07-CV-0347A(F) at 1; see also
http://www.kslaw.com/portal/server.pt (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
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prosaic litigation tactic into a violation of the ADR rules, and then into a
monetary sanction, was how the motion was used at mediation. This should
never have been disclosed by the plaintiffs based on the rules as they stood at
the time, and yet the judge dismissed defendant's argument on this point as
impeding the court's ability to exercise its "inherent authority" that has
apparently morphed to this point since Heileman.189 The end result, that a
party and its attorney were sanctioned for a negotiation tactic at mediation, or
perhaps for refusing to raise their offer, completely discards any pretext of
mediation confidentiality, and opens the door to subjective judicial
determination of the amorphous concept of good faith based on words and
conduct at mediation.
At the same time that courts have cracked the door ever wider to inquire
regarding whether litigants are complying in good faith with orders to
mediate, judges continue to entertain and sometimes grant sanctions motions
for disclosing mediation communications made confidential by local rule.
These sanctions may be imposed on the very parties who commence the
exchange by seeking sanctions for mediation misconduct, filing in support
affidavits recounting what transpired at mediation. For example, in Williams
v. Johanns, 190 Plaintiffs' counsel in a case against the U.S.D.A. filed a
"Memorandum Submission on Mediation," which provided a detailed factual
explanation for counsel's contention that the defendants had not participated
in mediation in good faith. The memorandum was accompanied by an
affidavit, and both revealed to the court that the defendants had taken the
position at mediation that they had no liability in the case. 191 How this is
substantively distinguishable from the motion in Fisher, supra, which
discussed defendant's refusal to raise its offer at mediation, is not readily
apparent.
The outcome of the two motions, however, could not have been more
different. The plaintiffs' attorney in Williams not only failed to obtain the
relief he sought, but was held in contempt and fined for violating a
confidentiality order by revealing statements made in the course of
mediation. This was despite the fact that the district court rules in Williams,
just as in Fisher, included an exception to the general rule of mediation
confidentiality for the reporting of violations of the court's ADR rules, which
189 See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
190 Williams v. Johanns, 529 F. Supp. 2d 22, 23 (D.D.C. 2008).
191 Plaintiffs Memorandum Submission on Mediation as Authorized by Magistrate
Judge Facciola at para. 2, Williams, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 22.
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in turn imposed the obligation of good faith that was the subject of the
Williams attorney's filing.192
Based on the foregoing, it should be apparent that the flowering of
mediation sanctions motion practice over the last decade has spawned a body
of often-unreported case law1 93 that is both inconsistent and, at times,
incoherent. The perception of relative uniformity suggested by the fact that
the local district court rules exhibit a high degree of similarity regarding their
purported protection of mediation confidentiality is belied by the variation
with which courts have enforced these rules. Although these characteristics
of increased judicial management of mediation, and uncertain application of
the local rules, may serve as a compelling basis to develop a uniform
mediation privilege, the analysis of this issue and the characterization and
scope of any such analysis must necessarily entail a review of the reasons for
protecting confidentiality inherent in the mediation process.
IV. THE NEED FOR A RULE OF EXCLUSION: ANSWERING THE "WHY"
QUESTION
At this juncture, a caveat is in order: this article does not purport to
provide a prescriptive regarding the source or the propriety of the district
courts' supposed authority to demand that parties participate in court-ordered
mediation in good faith. That has been a subject of considerable scholarly
attention over the years, with plausible arguments on both sides. 194 Rather,
192 D.D.C. R. 84.9(c)(4), 84.10, App. A; W.D.N.Y. ADR PLAN § 5.8(G); see also
infra Appendix.
193 None of the antics in Doe v. Francis were reported in the Federal Supplement.
Short of district-by-district review of Case Management/Electronic Case Filing
(CM/ECF). PACR filings, one would have very little way of knowing how many similar
situations have arisen over the last several years. One excellent resource, however, is the
Mediation Case Law Project maintained by the Hamline University School of Law. The
project created a comprehensive database of cases in which mediation issues were
litigated, and can be found at http://law.hamline.edu/adr/mediation-case-law-project.html
(last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
194 See ABA Sec. of Disp. Resol., Resolution on Good Faith Requirements for
Mediators and Mediation Advocates in Court-Mandated Mediation Programs (Aug. 7,
2004), http://www.abanet.org/dispute/draftres2.doc; STEPHEN J. WARE, PRINCIPLES OF
ALTERNATIVE DispuTE RESOLUTION 335-36 (2d ed. 2007); Wayne D. Brazil, Should
Court-Sponsored ADR Survive?, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 241 (2006); Dr. lur.
Ulrich Boettger, Efficiency Versus Party Empowerment-Against a Good-Faith
Requirement in Mandatory Mediation, 23 REv. LITIG. 1 (2004); Roger L. Carter, Oh, Ye
of Little [Good] Faith: Questions, Concerns and Commentary on Efforts to Regulate
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this analysis begins with two apparently conflicting premises. First, a court
has the right and the obligation to ensure that its orders are followed, at least
to a point. Second, confidentiality is essential to the integrity and the
effectiveness of the mediation process.195 The conflict lies in the fact that
courts have dissonantly articulated adherence to the principle of mediation
confidentiality and at the same time maintained their authority to control
what transpires at mediation, even though this often entails judicial
evaluation of communications expressly protected from disclosure. The
issue, thus framed, is one that lends itself to the sort of interest focus that is
familiar to any student of ADR. What interests are advanced by mediation
confidentiality, and to what extent do they actually conflict with the court's
interest in managing its docket by ensuring good faith compliance with its
mediation orders?' 96 Is there a way to reconcile these interests in a way that
maximizes the benefit to both the mediation process and the judiciary that
has harnessed mediation to its own ends? As will be explored in more detail
below, the interests protected by mediation confidentiality are sufficiently
narrow and well-defined that a rule of exclusion may operate in a way that
not only preserves the judicial prerogative to ensure compliance with its
orders, but in fact advances the ultimate goals of docket management and
cost savings.
A. Policy-Based Arguments for an Exclusionary Rule
Much of the mischief that has evolved with regard to mediation oversight
in federal court may owe its origins to a misunderstanding of the purpose of
mediation confidentiality. Among most commentators, the policy bases for
protecting mediation communications from disclosure fall broadly into two
categories. The first recognizes the importance of confidentiality as a means
Participant Conduct in Mediations, 2002 J. DisP. RESOL. 367; Kimberlee K. Kovach,
New Wine Requires New Wineskins: Transforming Lawyer Ethics for Effective
Representation in a Non-Adversarial Approach to Problem Solving: Mediation, 28
FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 935 (2001); John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to
Promote Good-Faith Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA
L. REV. 69, 79-82 (2002); Landsman, supra at note 13; Edward F. Sherman, Court-
Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution: What Form of Participation Should Be
Required?, 46 SMU L. REV. 2079, 2085 (1993); Weston, supra note 35, at 609-18.
195 For a concise articulation of the policy arguments in support of affording legal
protection to mediation confidentiality, see Deason, supra note 17, at 563-65.
196 The concept of separating positions from interests was first popularized in
ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM L. URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WrIHOUT GIVING IN (1981).
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of protecting party autonomy or, in the alternative, the voluntariness of the
process and any resulting settlement.197 The notion is that by preventing
disclosure, courts protect parties from being extorted into settlement by the
threat that their statements may become public.198 There is broad recognition
that a party whose communications or conduct may ultimately find their way
onto the desk of the local district judge may have an incentive to settle that is
based on the fear of sanctions rather than the merits of the case or the cost of
going forward, and that settlement on this basis is not generally desirable. 199
On balance,200 the prevention of settlement coercion is seen as a beneficial
effect of confidentiality. In addition, autonomy includes the premise that a
197 Kirtley, supra note 129, at 18; Litt, supra note 31, at 1021.
198 Izumi & La Rue, supra note 43, at 74; cf Ellen E. Deason, The Need for Trust as
a Justification for Confidentiality in Mediation: A Cross-Disciplinary Approach, 54 U.
KAN. L. REv. 1387 (2006) (arguing importance of trust as basis for mediation
confidentiality, because of risk of disclosing sensitive matters discussed during
mediation, and importance of information sharing in reaching optimal agreement);
Sherman, supra at note 194, at 2085-86 (observing that one advantage of mediation over
settlement conferences is that settlement conferences involved "judge who used a
combination ofjaw-boning and veiled threats to move the parties toward settlement.").
199 See, e.g., Powell v. Carey Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1298 n.28 (S.D. Fla.
2008) (refusing to award sanctions against attorney who mistakenly included mediation
communications in affidavit, noting that opposing counsel's motion for sanctions "causes
concern as the manner in which Plaintiffs' counsel attempted to profit from defense
counsel's error is tantamount to extortion."); Doe v. Nebraska, 971 F. Supp. 1305, 1308
(D. Neb. 1997) ("Obviously the protections of the confidentiality provisions would be
undermined if they could be circumvented by filing a motion for sanctions and the
confidential information could later be used in the litigation in any way against either of
the parties.").
200 This is not to say that confidentiality may not provide a veil for conduct that
undercuts voluntariness. For instance, commentators have noted that unscrupulous
mediators or mediation participants may resort to coercion or deception as means of
effecting a settlement, and such conduct would arguably be protected from disclosure by
confidentiality rules. See Timothy Hedeen, Coercion & Self-Determination in Court-
Connected Mediation: All Mediations Are Voluntary, but Some Are More Voluntary than
Others, 26 JUST. Sys. J. 273, 279-83 (2005) These concerns are particularly acute where
there is asymmetry of legal or informational resources between the parties, or where
gender or socioeconomic characteristics make one party particularly vulnerable to
coercive misconduct. See Michael Z. Green, Tackling Employment Discrimination with
ADR: Does Mediation Offer a Shield for the Haves or Real Opportunity for the Have-
Nots?, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 321, 347-53 (2005); Phyllis Gangel-Jacob, Some
Words of Caution About Divorce Mediation, 23 HOFSTRA L. REv. 825, 833-35 (1995);
Mori Irvine, Mediation: Is It Appropriate for Sexual Harassment Grievances?, 9 OHIO
ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 27, 36-40 (1993).
752
[Vol. 25:3 2010]
IS IT TIME FOR A FEDERAL MEDIATION EXCLUSIONARY RULE?
party cannot be forced to continue negotiating once he or she is unwilling to
go forward. As I have heard many mediators say over the years, and have
said before in my opening remarks when mediating a case, "I can't make you
stay and I can't make you settle." 201 Notwithstanding, most mediation
participants perceive that staying is in their best interest.
The second policy basis is more substantive. The mediation bargaining
process, to be effective, requires a measure of candor from the parties, and to
induce such candor a confidentiality rule must prevent the parties from
disclosing substantive concessions regarding the merits of the case if the
mediation fails to bring about a settlement.202 Concomitantly, preventing
disclosure of substantive discussions in caucus preserves the neutrality of the
mediator, insofar as he or she cannot be compelled to testify later regarding a
party's admissions. 203 Absent such protections, mediation would have much
less chance of success, to the extent "success" is measured in terms of
settlement.204
The protections afforded the mediator are compromised by the
widespread local rules that impose a duty on the mediator to report perceived
"bad faith" to the trial judge,205 given that her actions may result in the
imposition of sanctions for one party and against another. Once again, Doe v.
201 Note, however, that some local rules reserve to the mediator the right to declare
an impasse, suggesting that a mediator would, in fact, have the right to compel continued
attendance, at least to a point. See, e.g., W.D.N.Y. PROPOSED R. 16.2-1(o)(3); M.D. PA.
R. 16.8.6(b); N.D. GA. R 16.7(J)(3)(b); N.D. ALA. R. 16.1, ADR Plan R. IV(B)(9)(f).
202 See, e.g., Lake Utopia Paper Ltd., v. Connelly Containers, Inc., 608 F.2d 928,
930 (2d. Cir. 1979) ("If participants cannot rely on the confidential treatment of
everything that transpires during these sessions then counsel of necessity will feel
constrained to conduct themselves in a cautious, tight-lipped, non-committal manner
more suitable to poker players in a high-stakes game than to adversaries attempting to
arrive at a just resolution of a civil dispute. This atmosphere if allowed to exist would
surely destroy the effectiveness of a [mediation] program."), quoted in Litt, supra note
31, at 1020.
203 Izumi & La Rue, supra note 43, at 82-84.
204 In fact, there is reason to question whether mediation has a substantive effect on
the rate of settlement. As documented by Wissler, supra note 17, at 668, the rate of
settlement for mediated and non-mediated cases in her study were roughly the same. The
fact is that most cases settle whether they are mediated or not, although the quality of the
settlement may arguably be better, in the sense that participants perceive that it is more
"fair", if it is the result of a mediation. Id. at 661-67.
205 See, e.g., E.D. Mo. R. 16-6.05(A); D. NEB. GEN. R. 1.2(h), Mediation Plan R.
4(g); see also JEFFREY M. SENGER, FEDERAL DISPuTE RESOLUTION: UsING ADR WffH
THE UNiTED STATES GOVERNMENT 178-79 (2003) (discussing importance of
confidentiality to maintain mediator impartiality).
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Francis provides the most extreme example of where this can lead. The
mediator in that case was ordered to provide periodic updates to the judge,
during the mediation session, regarding whether he thought the parties were
making progress toward settlement.206 A negative evaluation by the mediator
could have resulted in the judge reinstating the contempt order and sending
Francis to jail. It is difficult to imagine how a mediator, even a very good one
as in this case,207 could maintain a patina of neutrality when his contact with
the judge indirectly gave him the keys to the jailhouse door.
The mediator's role in a good faith compliance scheme constitutes a
fundamental alteration of the mediation process, substantially reducing the
mediator's efficacy by transforming him into a witness and an arbiter of the
parties' compliance with a mediation referral order.208 A mediator's ability to
facilitate resolution of a dispute turns upon his ability to convey a genuine
impartiality toward the parties,209 particularly given his role in "reality-
testing" the positions parties bring with them into the negotiations. 210 The
knowledge that the mediator may ultimately be called upon to testify
regarding what transpired in caucus will logically cause parties to hold back
information211 and take steps designed not to move the case toward
settlement, but to prove to the mediator that they prepared for the mediation
206 Francis, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D at 241 (order).
207 The mediator in the Francis case was Dominic Caparello, a partner in the law
firm of Messer, Caparello & Self in Tallahassee, Florida. Caparello is one of the most
established and well-respected mediators in Florida. See profile at
http://www.lawfla.com/Lawyers/Dominic-M-Caparello.aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
208 See Nancy A. Welsh, The Place of Court-Connected Mediation in a Democratic
Justice System, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 117, 136-37 (2004) ("[A]s the courts
have come to rely on mediators as the next set of judging adjuncts, the mediation process
and the roles of both mediators and parties have changed.").
209 See N.L.R.B. v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51, 55-56 (9th Cir. 1980) ("To
execute successfully their function of assisting in the settlement of labor disputes, the
conciliators must maintain a reputation for impartiality.... If conciliators were permitted
or required to testify about their activities, or if the production of notes or reports of their
activities could be required, not even the strictest adherence to purely factual matters
would prevent the evidence from favoring or seeming to favor one side or the other. The
inevitable result would be that the usefulness of the [conciliators] in the settlement of
future disputes would be seriously impaired, if not destroyed."), quoted in SENGER, supra
note 205, at 179.2 10 See Deason, supra note 17, at 564 ("Mediator neutrality, 'a primary value of
mediation,' depends on the mediator's ability to avoid taking sides. Neutrality is
impossible, however, if a mediator is called to testify about events in a mediation..)
(internal quotation and citation omitted).
211 Litt, supra note 31, at 1022.
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and appeared in good faith. Further, one must question exactly what sort of
questions a mediator may fairly ask in caucus, knowing that the responses
may become a matter of public record. Can a mediator remain neutral, while
at the same time potentially serving as the court's witness regarding whether
a party had prepared or negotiated in good faith? 212
Moreover, although the various district court rules contain sometimes
elaborate procedures to address the issue of good faith, they give little
attention to the growing problem of using a mediation sanctions motion as a
coercive tool in negotiations. 213 A review of the district courts' rules
regarding confidentiality, good faith, and the reporting obligations of
mediators demonstrates that while these rules sometimes appear to recognize
directly or indirectly the policy consideration of candor, to some degree, they
do not address the issue of coercive use of sanctions motions at all. In fact, as
discussed elsewhere in this article, 214 several courts have provided a vehicle
for such coercive conduct by setting up separate tribunals tasked with
consideration of sanctions for alleged misconduct in court-ordered ADR
proceedings.2 15 Thus, if anything the courts have facilitated this sort of
litigation.
In practice, mediation confidentiality in the federal courts amounts to
little more than the protections already embodied in Federal Rule of
Evidence 408, preventing the introduction of a compromise statement for the
212 For example, N.D. GA. R. 16.7(H)(d), provides a list of questions the parties must
be prepared to answer for the mediator. Is the mediator to appraise the parties' good faith
based on their answers to these questions?
213 The problem of using as a coercive tool a rule designed to deter abuse of the
judicial process is not a new one. With the advent of FED. R. CIv. P. 11 in 1983, the
courts saw a flood of sanctions motions that were filed almost de rigueur in response to
any filing or action by the opposing party that could form a marginally supportable basis
for sanctions. See Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189,
197-200 (1988). In response to this misuse of Rule 11, it was amended a decade later to
curb this abuse of a rule designed to curb abuse. The reform conferred discretion upon the
courts with regard to the imposition of sanctions (they had previously been mandatory if
the court found a Rule 11 violation), and provided a twenty-one day safe harbor within
which a party could withdraw an otherwise sanctionable filing. FED. R. CIv. P. 11
advisory committee's notes to 1993 amendment; see also Matthew G. Vansuch, Icing the
Judicial Hellholes: Congress' Attempt to Put Out "Frivolous" Lawsuits Burns a Hole
Through the Constitution, 30 SEToN HALL LEGIS. J. 249, 295-98 (2006).
214 See infra text accompanying notes 226-27.
215 See, e.g., S.D. GA. R. 16.7.7(b) (report to clerk); D. UTAH Civ. R. 16-2(j)(1),
ADR Plan § 6(i)(2)(C) (same); N.D. OHIO Civ. R. 16.6(g)(5) (report to ADR
Administrator); W.D. Mich. R. 16.4(d) (same); E.D. CAL. Civ. R. 271(n)(1) (same) and
271(o)(1) (report to judge).
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purpose of proving liability or damages. 216 In fact, some courts have
expressly crafted their rules of mediation confidentiality to be coextensive
with Rule 408.217 Such a narrow application of the policy considerations
inherent in mediation, as opposed to other ADR processes, transforms
mediation into little more than a judicial settlement conference with the
mediator standing as a proxy for the judge or special master.
Finally, the development of an elaborate good faith sanctions scheme to
ensure compliance with mediation referral orders harms the mediation
process by moving further in the direction of litigizing it. Over the last three
decades, mediation has absorbed far more of the courthouse than the
courthouse of mediation, and commentators have observed that mediation
has been degraded by absorbing litigation values such as adversarialness. 218
With the adoption of mediation as a docket management tool has come a
multi-layered system of oversight into the qualifications of mediators, the
scheduling and basic structure of mediation, the general ground rules for
participation, and now extremely detailed direction from many district courts
regarding how the court demands that the parties participate. 219 In a way, the
district judge's order directing Joe Francis to appear at mediation with
closed-toed shoes was just another step in this process.220
Recognizing a limited rule of mediation confidentiality offers the
opportunity to arrest this trend by drawing a line at the mediation conference
door beyond which the court may not intrude or inquire. It allows mediation
to remain mediation, with all of the messiness and flexibility inherent in a
process driven by the participants rather than the judge. It also, as discussed
below, advances the very goal that led courts to embrace mediation instead of
the judicial settlement conference, insofar as protecting confidentiality will
almost certainly lead to less judicial workload, and more settlements.
B. Outcome-Based Arguments for a Rule ofExclusion
One might argue that the federal courts should have the ability to craft
their own version of what constitutes mediation because of its utility as a
docket management tool. Perhaps if parties are given free reign to say or do
216 FED. R. EvID. 408; SENGER, supra note 205, at 188.
217 See, e.g., S.D. ALA. R. 16.6, ADR Plan R. IV(A)(l 1); cf Doe v. Nebraska, 971 F.
Supp. 1305, 1307 (D. Neb. 1997) (framing reasons for mediation confidentiality rule in
terms of Rule 408 policy goals).
218 Izumi & La Rue, supra note 43, at 92-97.
2 19 See N.D.N.Y R. 83.11-5, for example.
220 See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
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what they want at mediation, fewer cases will settle and the purposes of the
ADR Act, as well as the inherent authority of the trial courts to manage their
dockets, will be undermined. This argument has particular appeal when taken
from the abstract to the specific: Who could argue that a litigant's right to
harangue his opponents with obscenities, or to make a ridiculously low offer
that reflects no meaningful evaluation of the case, should be protected?221 IS
there a right to boorish behavior, particularly when it means a more crowded
federal docket?
The responses to this line of reasoning are threefold. First, there is no
evidence that the district courts' ability to monitor litigants' behavior at
court-ordered mediation has appreciably reduced the size of the trial docket.
In fact, if one shifts focus from the number of cases that have settled at
mediation to the volume of motions related to mediation misconduct that
have been filed over the decade since the passage of the ADR Act, it appears
that the self-imposed obligation to monitor the integrity of the mediation
process has actually increased the workload of the district courts.222 Two
developments infer such a conclusion. First, a review of the reported and
unreported district court rulingS223 related to alleged mediation misconduct
shows an upward trend over the last several years,224 when previously such
motions, though not unknown, were significantly more rare.225 Thus,
empirically the imposition of a mediation mandate has apparently created
new grist for motion practice. This observation is borne out by the
designation in some district courts of a "Compliance Judge," 226 tasked with
wading through sanctions motions in search of some deviation from the
221 Weston, supra note 35, at 604; see also Brazil, supra note 194, at 256 (arguing
that providing mechanisms for parties to complain and seek relief from courts for failing
to meet requirements of court-ordered ADR is positive, because this gives courts ability
to develop standards, and "become sources of legal discipline and ethical guidance for the
field at large.").
222 See supra Part II(A), for discussion of evolution of trial court monitoring of
participation in court-ordered mediation.
223 This refers to the unreported decisions found on Westlaw and Lexis, not to every
CM/ECF filing over the last decade. That said, there is no reason to believe that the trend
on CM/ECF is materially different.
224 See Coben & Thompson, supra note 60, at 52-53.
225 There were several decisions that followed the passage of the 1990 Act. See, e.g.,
Francis v. Women's Obstetrics and Gynecology Group, P.C., 144 F.R.D. 646, 646
(W.D.N.Y. 1992). Such motions and rulings appear to have been virtually unknown
before then.
226 See, e.g., D. UTAH Civ. R. 16-2(i).
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express or implied obligation to mediate in good faith.227 Although such
tribunals seem meant to advance the salutary goal of insulating the trial judge
from being influenced by the recounting of one side's mediation pecadillos,
the mere fact that such a forum exists suggests that court-annexed ADR
programs have ironically increased judicial workload just as the volume of
cases going to trial has declined.
Second, there is no reason to believe that a court's monitoring of the
mediation process, or the corresponding threat of sanctions, has increased the
efficacy of mediation as a settlement catalyst. In fact, if anything the erosion
of confidentiality that necessarily accompanies increased judicial oversight
almost certainly diminishes the likelihood that mediation will result in
settlement. 228 As discussed above, 229 mediators rely on the candor of the
parties to facilitate crafting solutions that advance or preserve the interests of
both sides. A party that knows the substance of its negotiations may become
the subject of a motion before the court will almost certainly become more
measured in its disclosures, giving the mediator that much less with which to
work. Likewise, an emotional outburst may well reflect the genuine feelings
of a party toward an opponent or the litigation process in general. While such
cathartic behavior may be uncomfortable for those in the room, it may well
contribute to the understanding of the mediator or the opposing party of the
actor's interests in the dispute, which in turn may provide insights into
alternatives for resolution of the lawsuit. 230 The threat of sanctions must
necessarily dampen any such communications to the detriment of the
effectiveness of the mediation process.
227 Another variation on this theme is the designation of an ADR Program
Administrator, who may be tasked with evaluating complaints of mediation misconduct
and deciding whether judicial intervention is appropriate. See, e.g, C.D. ILL. R. 16.4-E(3)
(providing for post-mediation reporting to court ADR Administrator).
228 One could at least infer that it was the lack of judicial oversight, and attendant
increase in effectiveness as a vehicle for settling cases, that led to mediation's preference
over the judicial settlement conference as a docket management tool. See Sherman, supra
note 194, at 2082 (arguing that confidentiality is "essential to the capacity of an ADR
proceeding to achieve a settlement.").
229 See supra text accompanying notes 202-12.
2 30 See Sherman, supra note 194, at 2093 ("ADR offers a process of assisted
negotiation where the parties should be able to choose to be forthcoming and make
concession or not. To deny them the right to take strong, or even extreme, positions (for
example, that there is no liability or that a certain sum is the only basis on which a
settlement is possible) would deprive them of litigant autonomy and the legitimate right
to hold out and have those issues determined in a trial."); FIsHER, URY, & PATTON, supra
note 196.
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Finally, there is no reason for treating mediation the same as any other
process that could be lumped under the rubric of "ADR." A court has a
spectrum of alternative dispute resolution vehicles available for the
resolution of a given dispute, including arbitration, the settlement conference,
early neutral evaluation, mini-trial or summary jury trial, among others.231
All of these carry with them different expectations with regard to
confidentiality. Some district courts have been adept at crafting ADR rules
that recognize these distinctions, and provide different standards depending
on which type of ADR the parties employ, but this is the exception.232
Regardless, there is no reason that a district court must subject mediation to a
Procrustean bed233 that eliminates or circumscribes confidentiality in the
name of docket management, when other processes are available that do not
rely heavily, or at all, on confidentiality as a principle.
In sum, judicial oversight of the quality of party participation in court-
ordered mediation does nothing to advance the goal of docket management,
and in fact may inhibit this result. Parties' conduct and communication at
mediation becomes circumscribed, creating fewer opportunities for the
mediator to identify and address the interests giving rise to the dispute, and
therefore fewer opportunities for settlement. At the same time, any party with
the temerity to act out at a court-ordered mediation, or otherwise engage in
what the other side views as a lack of good faith, will likely face a motion for
sanctions that would never have been filed if the court had not invited it by
crafting a rule that purports to monitor the parties' behavior. If the desired
231 For a good overview of the various ADR processes, see the "ADR Blue Book"
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. "ADR Blue Book,"
Dispute Resolution Procedures in the Northern District Court of California, available at
http://www.adr.cand.uscourts.gov/ (follow "Dispute Resolution Procedures in the
Northern District of California-"ADR Blue Book"" hyperlink; then follow "Blue Book
3-09.pdf' hyperlink).
232 For instance, the Northern District of California has developed an extensive
menu of processes within its court-annexed ADR program, including both evaluative and
facilitative variations. See Wayne D. Brazil, Court ADR 25 Years After Pound: Have We
Found a Better Way?, 18 Omo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 93, 109-12 (2002) (describing
evolution of Northern District's ADR program).
233 A Procrustean bed is "a scheme or pattern into which someone or something is
arbitrarily forced." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 990 (11th ed.
2003). The term refers to Procrustes, who maintained an iron bed on which passersby
were invited to lie. If they were too tall, he would amputate the excess length of their
legs; if too short, he would stretch them on a rack. HUTemsoN DICTIONARY OF WORLD
MYTHOLOGY 197-98 (2005).
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result of engrafting mediation into a court-annexed ADR program is more
settlements, the current regime appears ill-suited to advance that goal.
V. IMPLEMENTING A MEDIATION EXCLUSIONARY RULE: ANSWERING
THE "How" QUESTION
As described above, the federal district courts have reacted unevenly to
Congress's mandate to implement mandatory ADR programs that include
rules protecting confidentiality. 234 Some have adopted such rules, and some
have not. Most have substantially disregarded any recognition of mediation
confidentiality, regardless of the existence of a confidentiality provision in
their local rules, when inquiring as to whether the parties participated in
mediation in good faith.235 What has evolved as a result is not really
mediation at all, at least not as the term is generally understood by lawyers
and mediators. Rather, what is called "mediation" in a typical uniform
scheduling order could more properly be understood as a variation on the
judicial settlement conference, with the mediator acting as a sort of special
master with the duty to report to the court as to what transpired.236
At the same time, the district courts have the authority, and perhaps in
some situations the duty, to ensure compliance with their orders. An order
referring a case to mediation would be meaningless if the parties simply
could decline to attend. The question, however, is the extent to which the
courts can and should monitor compliance with their mediation referral
orders once the mediation begins, particularly in light of the fact that most
federal courts at least purport to recognize some level of confidentiality with
regard to what transpires there. This article does not advance the proposition
that a district court has no role in monitoring its ADR program, but instead
suggests that if the parties opt for the ADR device called "mediation," among
a spectrum of options, they should be treated as having opted out of the level
of judicial supervision that has become increasingly common in federal
court.
234 See supra Part I.B. 1.
235 See id.
236 See Ettie Ward, Mandatory Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution in the
United States Federal Courts: Panacea or Pandemic?, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 77, 95
(2007) ("[Tlhere is increasing acknowledgement that at least some court-annexed ADR is
morphing into yet another version of the traditional settlement conference."); Welsh,
supra note 12.
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As discussed previously, mediation is different.237 Unlike other ADR
processes, mediation's bedrocks are party autonomy, undergirded by the
premise that nothing one says at mediation will be used against that party if
the case does not settle, and voluntariness-no one can be compelled to
settle. The threat that a party will disclose what transpired at mediation in
search of sanctions against the supposed miscreant party, particularly in light
of the increasingly receptive attitude of the judiciary, has led inexorably
toward the point where a party may face the decision, so succinctly stated in
the press with regard to the GGW case, of "settle or jail."238
This is not to say that the federal courts should adopt a blanket mediation
privilege. Most commentators, 239 as well as the drafters of state privilege
statutes and the Uniform Mediation Act, have recognized the need for
exceptions to mediation confidentiality for matters such as attorney ethics
violations and threats of violent or criminal behavior.240 The fact that these
sources are largely consistent in their conclusions with regard to exceptions
to mediation confidentiality, and that no state or uniform exception has been
recognized for lapses of "good faith," speaks volumes about the wisdom of
expanding the list to include such an exception.241
It is time for the federal courts to provide some level of uniform
mediation confidentiality, as mandated by the very language of the ADR Act
237 See Thompson, supra note 14, at 516 ("[M]ediation was designed as a very
different alternative to adversarial dispute resolution.").
238 David Angier, Judge to Francis: Settle or Jail: 'Girl's Gone Wild' Producer
Found in Contempt of Court, PANAMA CrrY NEWS HERALD, Mar. 31, 2007. The judge
later disavowed this interpretation of his actions in a lengthy order in a later case, Pitts v.
Francis, No. 5:07cvl69-RS-EMT, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93047 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 19,
2007) (court order on a motion for disqualification).
239 See, e.g., Mori Irvine, Serving Two Masters: The Obligation Under the Rules of
Professional Conduct to Report Attorney Misconduct in a Confidential Mediation, 26
RUTGERs L.J. 155, 166 (1994); Jaime Alison Lee & Carl Giesler, Case Comment,
Confidentiality in Mediation, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 285, 285-86 (1998) ("Valid
exceptions to the confidentiality rule may exist; rulemakers, whether judicial or
legislative, must weigh their policy implications and provide participants in advance with
clear rules as to how they will be handled.").
240 UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6(a) (2001).
241 See, e.g., Izumi & La Rue, supra note 43, at 67-68 (analyzing UMA's failure to
recognize "good faith" exception to mediation privilege at § 7(a) of the UMA). At the
same time, several states have, by rule or statute, imposed an obligation to participate in
court-ordered mediation in good faith, even while failing to recognize an exception to
their confidentiality rules to allow disclosure of alleged bad faith conduct. See, e.g., Miss.
MEDIATION R. Civ. LITIG. XV(A); N.J. CT. R. 1:40-4(g); N.M. MAGIS. CT. R. Civ. P. 2-
805(C); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1824(3) (2010).
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of 1998. Such a recognition need not approach ADR in plenary fashion, and
therefore could leave open the possibility of more active judicial supervision
of ADR through the selection of a process other than mediation. There are
numerous options by which a court might protect mediation confidentiality,
including privileges arising out of the common law or statute, or amendment
of the rules of evidence or of civil procedure. As discussed below, the best
means of stemming the erosion of confidentiality described in this article
would entail the amendment of FRCP Rule 16 to exclude any evidence of
mediation communications in support of a motion for sanctions under Rule
16.242
A. Common Law Mediation Privilege
One option for developing and implementing a mediation privilege is to
recognize a federal common law mediation privilege. Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Evidence 501, the federal courts may develop a common law
privilege "in the light of reason and experience." 243 Given the well-
developed ADR programs now in place throughout the federal judiciary,
coupled with a decade of experience in addressing the issues that have arisen
from implementing and monitoring court-mandated mediation, the courts
certainly have an ample experiential basis from which to develop a common
law privilege that would shield mediation communications.
At the same time, this experience suggests that a common law privilege
would be neither likely nor efficacious in addressing the issue of mediation
confidentiality. The courts have now managed ADR programs for years,
sometimes decades, and have yet to agree on a privilege. As of this writing,
only two district courts have expressly recognized a mediation privilege,
while the Sixth Circuit has adopted the far broader "settlement privilege" that
seems to subsume mediation communications as a subset of a much broader
rubric. 244 Even in these jurisdictions, however, it is not clear that the
privilege they have recognized necessarily serves to exclude evidence of
communications in order to prove a violation of those jurisdictions' good
faith obligations. Certainly the confidentiality protections incorporated into
the district courts' local rules have done little to impede the consideration of
these communications by courts faced with sanctions motions based on an
242 For a discussion of the distinction between use of an exclusionary rule and a
privilege to protect mediation confidentiality, see Deason, supra note 17, at 574-75.
243 FED. R. EviD. 501.
244 See supra Part H(B)(2).
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alleged lack of good faith. Why would a common law rule be any more
effective?
Besides the lack of uniformity of breadth among those courts that have
recognized a mediation privilege, there is the problem of uneven application
based on whether the issue before the court is considered to be one of federal
or state law. As discussed above, Rule 501 mandates that state law privilege
be applied whenever state law provides the rule of decision.245 This variable
sets the stage for inconsistent application of a mediation privilege, based
upon whether the trial judge frames the issue as one of state or federal law.
Although perceived defiance of a court's good faith mandate may seem more
a question of federal law, whether based on local rule or the inherent
authority of the court, a judge or a creative sanctions movant could just as
easily avoid the application of the privilege by characterizing the issue as a
matter of state contract law, for instance by shoehorning the alleged "bad
faith" into a common law basis for rescission of a mediation settlement
agreement. 246
Finally, mediation does not present the sort of situation that calls for the
creation of a privilege, rather than some more tailored form of protection.
Privileges are generally meant to protect certain confidential relationships,
such as attorney and client or physician and patient, that rely on
confidentiality to protect and foster the relationship itself.247 In contrast, the
parties to a mediation are two or more sets of adversaries, brought together in
a process facilitated by a mediator who necessarily lacks a relationship with
either side that extends beyond the mediation. Thus, the issue is not the
extent to which the disclosure of confidential mediation communications
might damage the parties' relationship; rather, it is the danger that disclosure
will undermine the negotiating process by inhibiting candor and calling into
question the impartiality of the mediator.248
245 FED. R. EVID. 501.
246 See Judge Brazil's analysis in Olam v. Cong. Mortg. Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110,
1110, 1119-28 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
247 See Maureen E. Laflin, The Mediator as Fugu Chef Preserving Protections
Without Poisoning the Process, 49 S. TEX. L. REv. 943, 946 (2008) ("Privileges are
meant to nurture specific interpersonal or professional relationships that courts, society,
and legislatures deem desirable."); cf Scott H. Hughes, The Uniform Mediation Act: To
the Spoiled Go the Privileges, 85 MARQ. L. REv. 9, 24-34 (2001) (explaining difference
between confidentiality and privilege, observing that privilege reflects "normative
choice" to protect confidential relationship, while confidentiality entails both confidential
relationship and affirmative duty to keep secrets).
248 Laflin, supra note 247, at 946; see also supra discussion accompanying notes
202-12.
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In sum, not only is the recognition of a federal common law mediation
privilege unlikely after at least ten years without such protections, it would
also fail to remedy the problem of providing predictability and decreasing the
number of sanctions motions before the courts. Absent a mandate from the
Supreme Court that does not appear forthcoming, one also faces the
likelihood that a privilege or rule of confidentiality would vary in scope in
the various jurisdictions where it is recognized. Given that this is a fair
description of the present situation, it is hard to see such a development as an
improvement.
B. Statutory Mediation Privilege
The most common means of protecting the confidentiality of mediation
communications at the state level is through a statutory mediation privilege.
Often this privilege mirrors the language of the UMA, or derives in part from
the UMA. These statutory privileges benefit from a high level of detail
regarding what is protected and what is not, providing specific lists of
exceptions to the privilege which make its application predictable. 249 Further,
the state courts have developed a fairly robust body of case law interpreting
their statutory mediation privileges, and how they dovetail with rule-based
schemes for implementing court-managed ADR programs. Thus, a statutory
privilege probably provides the most user-friendly means of understanding
and complying with a confidentiality requirement.
Three considerations militate against the adoption of a statutory federal
mediation privilege, however. First, as a practical matter, it may be difficult
or impossible to aggregate the political capital required for such a proposal to
make it through the legislative process. Second, and more substantive, is the
concern that a comprehensive statutory mediation privilege, with detailed
exceptions, may be more than is required to address the immediate problem.
The district courts have answered the mandate of the ADR Act by creating
local rules of confidentiality, and in most situations not involving sanctions
for alleged mediation misconduct, these rules appear to have functioned
effectively. If the issue providing impetus for a privilege is the surfeit of
sanctions litigation arising out of supposed mediation bad faith, a far less
comprehensive solution could achieve the end of upholding mediation values
and keeping these sorts of disputes out of the courtroom. Finally, the
249 Regarding the desirability of predictability, and the difficulties of attaining it
with regard to mediation confidentiality, see generally Ellen E. Deason, The Quest for
Unformity in Mediation Confidentiality: Foolish Consistency or Crucial Predictability?,
85 MARQ. L. REv. 79 (2001).
764
[Vol. 25:3 2010]
IS IT TIME FOR A FEDERAL MEDIATION EXCLUSIONARY RULE?
adoption of a statutory mediation privilege is inconsistent with the mandate
of the ADR Act. Congress's direction was that the district courts adopt local
confidentiality rules "[u]ntil such time as rules are adopted under chapter 131
of this title providing for the confidentiality of alternative dispute resolution
processes. . . ."250 This was not an invitation for the judiciary to punt the
issue back to Congress, but rather a directive that the courts eventually adopt
a uniform rule that protects ADR confidentiality. The time for this step is
now.
C. Rule-Based Protection of Mediation Confidentiality
The best option for protecting mediation confidentiality lies in amending
FRCP Rule 16. As discussed above, this appears to have been the intent of
Congress when it passed the ADR Act.251 Moreover, the abuses that have
transpired regarding supposedly confidential mediation communications
appearing in sanctions motions have evolved from an expansion of Rule 16's
mandate of good faith participation at settlement conferences to include
mediation.252 This blurring of the line between settlement conference and
mediation pre-dated the body of local rules mandating good faith
participation in court-ordered mediation, and in fact those later rules could be
viewed as the implementation of this flawed premise.253
An amendment to Rule 16, saying simply that "mediation
communications shall not be disclosed in a motion seeking sanctions under
this rule," would be sufficiently narrow in its scope to leave the district
courts with sufficient room to monitor compliance with their orders. Even
with the increase in sanctions motions based on alleged bad faith at
mediation, many of the motions still relate to failure to attend mediation at
all, or attending by phone or with no independent authority to settle.254 Such
motions would not be affected by a narrow rule of exclusion, and a court
could still order parties to appear at a place and time for mediation. All it
250 28 U.S.C. § 652(d) (2010).
251 See supra notes 27-30.
252 See supra Part II(A).
253 See id.
254 The author performed a search on Westlaw of the past five years of cases
involving good faith and mediation sanctions. During that period, the search revealed
thirty-five cases, of which most were decided in the last two years. This total does not
include cases such as Doe v. Francis, which were never available on Westlaw. Of these,
no less than ten related simply to the failure of a party to attend mediation, or the failure
to attend with sufficient settlement authority.
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would lose is the ability to monitor and manipulate the quality of what
transpires once the mediation conference begins. In addition, courts would
still have the ability to consider evidence of what transpired at mediation for
purposes unrelated to good faith, such as duress or fraud, as a basis for
rescinding a mediation settlement agreement. Thus, a less sophisticated or
weaker litigant would maintain the ability to seek judicial relief from the
substantive effects of what might otherwise be framed as "bad faith," but not
sanctions based on the same conduct.255
Notably, the proposed exclusionary rule would not apply in blanket form
to ADR generally. It is difficult to see how some ADR processes, most
notably arbitration or other such evaluative vehicles, are adversely impacted
by the lack of a cloak of confidentiality as is mediation.256 Reviewing the
case law that has developed since the CJRA and the ADR Act, there appears
to have been little motion practice for lack of "good faith," or failure to abide
by rules of confidentiality, associated with ADR processes other than
mediation.257 This may be because non-mediation ADR is now more rare, or
because confidentiality is neither expected nor necessary outside of the
mediation context. Thus, although the ADR Act speaks in terms of providing
a rule of confidentiality for ADR processes in general, the experience of the
last several years suggests a more narrow approach.
Such a targeted exclusion would also provide a powerful tool for party
autonomy. Those litigants who value a higher level of judicial supervision in
ADR would have the ability to select a process that does not carry a mantle
of confidentiality, leaving open the possibility of judicial intervention if the
opposing party undermines the process in ways that the court considers bad
faith or noncompliance with its ADR order. On the other hand, parties may
prefer mediation, notwithstanding the lack of oversight and the risks that
255 Scholars have extensively discussed the possibility that mediation's
confidentiality could be used as cover for aggressive behavior and negotiating tactics
directed at less sophisticated or experienced parties. See, e.g., Weston, supra note 35, at
595, 604; cf Deason, supra note 143, at 248 (observing that some mediation statutes are
incomplete in their coverage of need for disclosures in matters such as child abuse,
ongoing crime and mediator misconduct); Welsh, supra note 208, at 135-40 (advocating
increased judicial oversight to assure accountability of mediation process).
256 For a discussion of the importance of confidentiality in mediation, see supra Part
IV. Note that although courts are less likely to impose a rule of confidentiality with
regard to nonbinding arbitration, instead limiting the use of arbitration evidence in a
subsequent trial de novo, courts employing early neutral evaluation generally treat these
proceedings as confidential. See, e.g., N.D. CAL. ADR Loc. R. 5-1; N.D.N.Y. R. 83.12-
8.
257 Coben & Thompson, supra note 60, at 119-22.
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accompany it, because it provides a better chance of settlement than a less
opaque forum. Most experienced mediators and mediation participants have
encountered catharsis, posturing and intransigence, the very stuff of "bad
faith" in the eyes of some courts, as a presage to the eventual settlement of
the dispute, with the recalcitrant party agreeing to pay or accept a monetary
settlement at the end of the day.258 If mediation's advocates are to be
believed, and the principles of party autonomy and mediator neutrality bear
some functional relationship with the success of the mediation process as a
means of resolving disputes, many litigants will likely conclude that the
benefits of a confidential mediation are worth the risks.259
The implementation of such a narrow mediation rule of exclusion would
substantially limit the opportunities for judicial oversight in cases such as
those explored in Part II above. For instance, an attorney could take a hard
line at mediation, refusing to budge from a prior settlement offer as did the
attorney in Fisher,260 without fear of sanctions for what could be subjectively
viewed as "bad faith." Likewise, a plaintiff may feel free to "ignore advice,
cajoling, and common sense", as in Outar,261 if that is how he chooses to
negotiate. The courts would retain the right to ensure good faith attendance,
in the sense that the parties arrive at the appointed time and place, but their
right to monitor participation would necessarily be circumscribed. 262
So could a sanctions-seeking litigant bypass the proposed confidentiality
rule simply by resting her motion not on FRCP Rule 16, but upon the
"inherent authority" of the court? Based on the reasoning in Heileman, which
to some degree is the wellspring from which subsequent decisions based on
inherent authority to order good faith compliance with mediation orders
flowed, the answer to this question is probably "no." The majority in
Heileman viewed the district court's inherent authority as an adjunct to its
rule-based authority. Thus, a court may rely on its inherent authority to effect
258 See Sherman, supra note 194, at 2093 ("Many of these same factors are fairly
conventional tactics used by negotiators in law suits.").
259 See Kirtley, supra note 129, at 8, 15-19 (noting risks associated with informality
of mediation, and weighing costs and benefits of heightened confidentiality).
260 Fisher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 07-CV-0347A(F), 2008 WL 4501860
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2008).
261 Outar v. Greno Indus., Inc., No. 03-CV-0916, at 2, 2005 WL 238740 (N.D.N.Y.
Sept. 27, 2005).
262 Not all commentators see such a lack of judicial oversight as a good thing,
however. See Thompson, supra note 14, at 565-72 (arguing that eclipse of facilitative
mediation by more evaluative techniques, and courts' goal of settlement, requires
increased judicial oversight in interest of public justice).
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the remedial purpose of Rule 16, specifically "to urge judges to make wider
use of their powers and to manage actively their dockets from an early
stage."263 At the same time, a district court "may not exercise its inherent
authority in a manner inconsistent with rule or statute,"20 and "'where the
rules directly mandate a specific procedure to the exclusion of others,
inherent authority is proscribed." 265 By this standard, a litigant could not
skirt the express prohibition against disclosure of confidential mediation
communications in a motion for sanctions under Rule 16 by simply saying it
was instead seeking sanctions under the district court's inherent authority.
Because the proposed amendment to Rule 16 bars the consideration or
disclosure of confidential mediation communications, the space within which
a court could rely on its inherent authority in this area would be
circumscribed, and likely eliminated altogether.
Had a rule such as the one proposed in this article been in place in 2007,
it probably would not have saved Joe Francis from sanctions, although he
may have avoided a jail cell. Recall that Francis's obscene rant in the
opening session was not his first affront of the day-he arrived at the
mediation four hours late. If the trial judge's authority had been limited by a
rule of confidentiality, he may never have heard what Francis said to the
plaintiffs' attorneys, or how he acted in those explosive moments before they
walked out of the room, but he could well have been apprised of the fact that
Francis kept everyone waiting, at a cost of thousands of dollars an hour in
attorneys' fees.266 Had the plaintiffs chosen to seek sanctions at that point,
rather than spending another day negotiating with Francis after he had
supposedly scuttled the entire mediation, they would have had a colorable
argument that they were entitled to their fees for preparation and for
spending half a day sitting in a hotel lobby waiting for the defendant, and
could have sought their own and their clients' costs associated with
attendance. The imposition of a mediation confidentiality rule would affect
none of those remedies.
263 G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir.
1989).
264 Id.
26 5 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Landau & Cleary, Ltd. v. Hribar Trucking, Inc.,
867 F.2d 996, 1002 (7th Cir. 1989)).
266 There were four attorneys representing the plaintiffs at the mediation. Their fees,
combined with those of the mediator, would have been well in excess of $1500-2000 an
hour. See Notice of Filing in Support of Motion for Sanctions, Doe v. Francis, 18 Fla. L.
Weekly Fed. D 241, 241 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 8, 2003).
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So why was it a problem for the plaintiffs to go a step further, and
recount what Francis said when he arrived? Simply put, there is no
objectively measurable line between a communication meant to subvert the
mediation process, and words offered to convey a party's unwillingness to
bend on certain issues. The distinction between these purposes may lie in the
mind of the speaker, but the words and motives are analyzed and delivered to
the court through the prism of either a disappointed opposing party or an
ostensibly neutral mediator. By allowing one's distaste for this defendant's
choice of words, or perhaps his line of business, to color one's analysis of
whether he deserved his fate, one loses sight of the fact that it is impossible
to throw Francis into his jail cell without leaving the cell door open for every
other litigant who may have the temerity to speak candidly in reliance on the
supposed confidentiality of mediation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Over the last two decades, the federal district courts have embraced
mediation as their docket management tool of choice. In the process, they
have changed the nature of mediation, and compromised its principles, in an
attempt to integrate mediation into case management through the
implementation of detailed rules prescribing not only the logistics of the
process, but also the quality of parties' participation in mediation. Ironically,
judicial efforts to monitor and advance the efficacy of mediation as a means
of settling cases have undermined its effectiveness as a docket management
tool, as the courts have faced an ever-growing number of sanctions motions
for alleged bad faith noncompliance with mediation orders. By distorting the
behavior of participants who are conscious of the possibility of monetary
sanctions, or perhaps even jail, for failure to comply with the amorphous
good faith standard, courts likely also undermine the effectiveness of
mediation as a means of settling cases, thereby further adding to what some
perceive as a crowded docket. Although indirect, the recognition of a narrow
mediation exclusionary rule would arrest this trend, and preserve mediation
as a distinct negotiation process.
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t:/AvMwwnad.uscourts.gaovineraldf/cambinted0L.pdf Ditrict of Rhode Island:
hnp:/Arwwid.uscouts./PDFS/ADR/2006%20ADR%20Plan%2OFinal.PDF
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IS IT TIME FOR A FEDERAL MEDIATION EXCLUSIONARY RULE?
Third Circuit
Eastem District of Wester District Middle District of District of District of the
Pennsylvania of Penrsylvneri District of Delaware NewJersey Virgin
Pen!sl ania Islands
Existence ofMandatoiy -2 d -o. TUlitd) : Ac)
Mediation Proem btelow mediee
Rule ofConfidentiality or 63fl mtcu. 6)16 W8c) JUfl(X4 3VTC
Piiesge 1 6b)
tmposed Obligatian of 1b)1 . L 3eM)c
GoodFaih
Obgatios to Report Back t1C.(9) i1uprnato utESYUp ntlw)
ToJ c lakofcoumt) tochk ofcod)
Reqjuirement ofFull Edmc.6u 38AA1T feEW taTllegs) J4.(eXJaritt)
Auisltto Settle peab ES bia peaigk 4asR3(e m)(3) I L
EasterDistct ofPennsylvani: htiplwwwp areduscouts.ovidocuents/locetesicivilicvrules.rif
Easte District fPennsylvania htnllww a eed usqoso oovidocumentslorulescivillerediation/medu533,0d
D.lfP l tt ll ldf, i ,wusf
westem sact ermsyvan - co uap .
Western Distrct ofPermsytvania httol/coldfusiar mawdscourts.coviedr/Doroenftd6 2.pdf
MiddleDistrictofPennsylvneri http//wwwnmd.s gourtsRav/isado/fS-6pd(staminugorder)
Middle DistrictofPennsylvania httpI//ww epamd usemuartstov/does/Jrl20107.pdf
District ofDelawae httl/wwwdd r1.uscurts or/fos/Localcules/LoclRulesCivil 06-30-07.odf
District ofNew Jersey htiel//www pidusurtovi~osalRules hemd
District ofVirgin Islands: htta/weww.vid.sccourtsoaoyftuies/CIVIL 0d
'Defineimpertialtra.sstormn" [frmemftmfsou imrbis inwcd, a dseloerac lceI senttyi peelirIscommitoun lid llrIItIe,as
oppordics a ndividual p , ioeingoward -n peast.
SECOND CIRCUIT
kstAnro Dstrmct of Southem Harrhan Disrica it Western Dsm District Of District of
New Yalk District of New Yiak Of New Ya Venet' CanneicTit
Nw Yok (proposed local
istance of 83.11(b) s3.12(e) 83.11-3(t) 16.2-1@) 16.3()
Medietion Prog 9FmRule a 83.11(d) 3.12(k) 83.11-5(d) 16.2-1(,) 16.3(k) hei)
Ccnadetsielkito
Priilege
Imposed Obligeto 83.12(j) 83.11-5(c) 16.2-1(1) 1.3(iX5)
of God Faith
obulgaetatodapart 83.12(i) 63.11-6 Repottro 18.2-15) 16.3(i) 1(6)
Ba To Judge ADR Chiknot
ReluretaitoffPhl1 83.11(cX2) 83.12() 83.11.5) 16.2-1(k) 16.3(g) h(3X)
Auharity to settle
sanulecis I 83.11-5(dX7) 16.2-1(m) 16.3(iX5)
EastemDistrict ofNew York: http:lwww.nied.usourts ovladr/Mediationlocal Rule 8311 flocal rule 8311 httml
Souther District of New York: httpl/wwwl.nsd.uscourts.ovlrlesfrul.pdf
NorthemDistnrctofNewYork. httpitwww n OmRS.t0VidtuentiectilG-2008pdf
Westem District of New York: htto Ilwww.ywd.uscourts.ovitcunent/ProposdLR.1-1-08.pdf
District of Vermont: httplwwwvtd.uscourtsoovisuvosrti_%20filesl/ne/IncalR lel63 pdf
District of Vernoit: htto:lwwwtd.uscourts.covl5uuortitt%20Files/ENE/ENEIntro.udf
District of Connecticut: httoI/www.ctd.courts.oviPDF%20Documrkentsilocal rulespdfu
1 .The ipific type of Atnsiitive Dispute Resohtion (ADRi)progrm
it effect rdthe District ofVenat ti Erl Neurel TEhntoan (EHE
The rules andpcrcedues govrning Vereot's pogm me detalledby
Locutalle fProcedze 16.3. SimilrtomostADRartediation
progeris intuse by etherfidershcurts,the parpose af Vd marEt'i E
pgamistoreduce ost,delyandpotailigtionfedbytle
parties.",er hfttp:Awwtduicouts.roit
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THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
District of Westem Middle Eastern Eastern Western Southern Northem District of
South District District District District District District District Maryland
Carolima North North North Virginia Virginia W. W.
Carolina Carolina Carolina Virginia Vi a
astence of 1693& 162(A) 1644 1(16DM(.)
Mardatoy 1605 8396(.)Hd)
Mediation
oR 16Do ( 16 163B5- luli-dEj -31)-tndg 1663- 16DR.e) 617J(4
Confolentiatity N.C. Ge. Std. Order
orPrivite e $7A-38.1 I(L)OXE)
Imposed166t~d)
COligatio of
GoodFaith
Oblhptgonto 1T1(H) 163(Cx3) 839(tf) 101e 836(B) 1668 160(
Report Backto
Requnanenof 16DB[)(2 163(D)(2) 839e.(d)(113) 101T.ldd) 836(H)- 1664 z 160 61/(3
Full Autbority & (4)
to SettleSanctions f r 1609 N.C.Gn. st A34 10 h 163 1
Noncompliance SA-381(g) 839e(h)
(20M8 NC I-
SL. 200B 194
(H]. 545) 7
Dirtid of touth Carelma: to:/Av eduouzrtsmooihRles/200Bev~les odf
Wore rfDisrit NosthCarolina: ItpIAiowwrwuouo-rrts oromet/lhRle.,df
Middle Ditrid NatlhCarolinte J~vww mendoucorts eoc4CIV LR.edf
rLatema rrasona00 .nr latpilrwwwneduscourts povrilshlambrLocaoleIw-os orq
Eteme DotritrVirginia: http IIw vdcourtsor/vulpiLocalRrleEDVA03140T/.pdf
Westrronlitict of Viorima tipoloww rowscour.ovishdersialtdistees pd
SathmDistrick WestV gi pte vwow wood uscost. rovthdfs/Localsneodod
NorthroamDistrict West Vivrna: Mtp IAww wcroulercouts or/Im/L~neilesloral-nle-oily2005 pd
DirtoftMayl.d: lto: ndduortsovLocalhuledloalmlee2Xrboud
SthCircuit
Southern Northern Etem Weotem Western Easte Middle Northern Southerm
District of District District District of District District District District District
Texas ofTexas ofTexas Texas of of of ofMiss. ofMiss.
Louisiana Louisiona Louisiana
Existence ofMandtory 164.B(2)& A CV-88( Cr2(a 83(1 83.7(
MediationaProgram 164.C H. V.
Rule of Confidentiality 1641 Appendie CV-( 1631W 11Ed) E-3 3(1 8(1
orPrivilege H VIII
Imposed Obligation of
GoodFaith
Obligationto Report 1641C t A CV8) 13W -6(s I Mpsti31() R()
BacktoJudge toADR H. IX. toADR
___________ Administrator) ch____h)_
Requirement ofFull 164Y Apperoix C d X-3( 3) 837(G(2)
Authority to Settle H.VII 8
Sanctions 164 M CV88(1) C-7Za 83:1 83 (R
SouthemDistriotofTexas: httoilowtxsuscouets oovidistrictesrcdclcritt2 0f
NorthernDistaict ofTexas: http://ww=tduscourtsovipdfCIVRULES.vdf
EasternDistrictofTexs: httilowwwtzed uscourts.eoviRules/LocalRules/Dooumentoaebap.pdf
WestermDistrictofTeas: httpilwwtzwduscourts.govrules/oine/c/cv-88adf
WesternDistrictofLouisiana: httalwwwolawd uscourtso vCourt Rulesilocalmlep9df
EasternDistrictofLouisiana: http/wwwlawd.uscourts.woavCourt Ruledinoendespdf
Middle District of Louisiana: httailwww laed.uscurts.ov/LocolRulesadr%20baton%0rouebtm
Northerm District ofMississippi: httoewwwomnd.uscrts.ov/loca/ol%2rules/lu lleooW4od?
SouthernDistrict ofMississippi: htted/wwwrsnduscourto. ovilocaol%20ules/Rulesv04dfd
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Sixth Circuit
Eastern Western Westen Eastern Northern Southern Westen Eastern Middle
District of District of District District District of District District of District of District of
Michigan Michigan of of Ohio ofOhio Tennessee Tennessee Tennessee
Kentucky Kentucky
Existn of 163(a) 16.6(.) I.3(nX) 16.1(c) 1s.4(.) teo 2(dXI)
Rale of te. "VolntAy 16.2 16.2 1t) 163(cX1) 16lIF 10008()
caodn stility ot Facilitoat (31
Priviley. Mation seo "wht
Paegan. is Eped
Desaipion" fom-
Hadition"
Imosed 16.3(,X4)
Obliptgad
Good Faith ________ ____
Obl-pionto 163(f) ADR 16&7(rX) teo 'What see 16.@n 16o0(p)
Repart sB w Administrator ADR to mp "Mbahad
Aid. Adiniestr F-o Prooen
Mediause Pln" Rub
6.
R- d 163(eXii) 16 " 6(f-) s w i.(j 104t) -10o2(0x(2)
Folfl holto to EPect
saleh
Hiedi,-stian") 
d~Sanctionsfor 16.3(.X4)16() 6.2
EastemnDistrict ofMichigazc http3 lwwwmieduscourtsmviRules/RuleV iewer.cfm9n=11R%2016.3
Westem District ofMichigan: httellwwwmiwd.uscouts.ay/RULE5%200PINIONSILocal%.20CivilK20Ruls.pdf
Wtfl Dito t flo,. Mih~oio, h,1, no,,,o5oo cot oc~ Ao dto, htm
es em sr a: R ww. . -c -1--. es.
Western District ofKetucky: httpi/wwwhlwdo uscourts.eovLdfltoint Civil Rules.pdf
Eastern District of Ketucky: http lwww kved.uscooseoviformispdf files/Civil Rules-2.pdf
Northern District of Ohio: httJ/wwwohnd uscourts.govClerk s Oflice/Local Ruleskivil-rules-10-6-08,sdf
Southern District of Ohio: httm :/w obsd uscourts rovlocalzulesobsdlocalrules200O8080.Edf
Southern District of Ohio: httsllwww obsd ascouits ovlmediationfaq.html "What To Expect fIn Mediation"
Western District ofTennessee: httlwwwtnwd.uscouts.acovindftcontentLocalRules df
Western District ofTennessee: httowwtnwd escourts.covipdfontentMediationPlatood "Mediation Progr Plan"
Eastern District ofTennessee: http://wwined.uscourts ravidacs/local ruleslocahules.odf
7th Circuit
Northem Southern Central Northern Southem Eastern Western
District of District of District of District of District of District of District of
Ilinoisi Illinois Illinois Indiana Indiana Wisconsin WisconsinExistenceof 16.3(a) 1h ()6a
MardatoryMediation
RuleaOfiConideiaity I63(cT);83. 16.dEXT F 166(c),see tee Westhwand - 16.6 W166B)
of Prvlee Westhw and Irdiansstatute
ladian.statute entitled:
entitled "S.D.Ind A.D.R.
"Alternative Rule 1 6"
Dispute
Ersotion
Rule 2.11"
ImposedObhlption of 16.6(c);see See Westhw and
Good Faith Westow and lradieastatute
ladianestatute entitled.
entitled: "S.DInd ADR
"Altenative Role 2.1"
Dispute
Resolution
Rule 2.1
ObliptientoReport Appe. 16.4(3) 166(c);see See Westhwand
Back to Jud VII. (A) Rtport to ADR Westhw and Irdiano statute
Administzator Indianastatute entiled
entitd "SDjId.ADR
"Alternative 2.6(eXI)
Dispute
Resolution
Rule27(E)" I
RequirementofFoll AppendiB IA(E6) 166(c);see See Westhaward
AutheritytoSettle VI.(G) Westw and Ininastatute
Applies only to the Federal Trademark Act of 1946 ("the Lanom Act")
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il siffole,
entitled:
"Alternative
Resolotion
27(BX2)"
enttane
S.Dld. A.DAR
Rule 26(b))
Sooms for AppendizB. 16A(EX6) 16.6(); see See Westawand
Nonoznspliance V. (C); VI. (H) Westlw end ledianastatte
Indian eidtl&
stabute "SDIndAD.R,
entitled: RoleO2.9
"Altemaetive
Dispute
Resotioni
1- -1 Rule 2. 10'
Northem District of Illinois: httpl/ww.ilnd.uscourts.gov/LEGAi NewRules/LR207.pdf
Southern District of Illinois: httplww.ilsd.uscourts.govIForms/ocaI Rules Rev6Rpdf
Central District of illinois: httpillwww.uleduscourts.gov/rulesILCO/20Local/20Ruleso2005-20-2008.odf
Northern District of Indiana: htte .//ww.innd uscourts.govidocslocalrules/1rodf
Southern District of Indiana: http:www insd uscourts.gov/
Eastem District of Wisconsin: http://www wied uscourts gov/drdocuments/LocalRules.PDF
Western District of Wisconsin: httpil/www wiwd uscourts.gov/rules/local rules.html#Rule3
Diactaf isizicor DiOsrtor Ditri East Wes s Wesem Soulhn Noia
North South Nebos1o. fmnsot Disrit Dostrit DIstrinf Disrictf Disritaf Dostr
Doakr Dakot. of of issouri Missi tows of ow.
PAns- Aikana
Eisece of 12(B) Rite 2 16..3(t2) Plese 16-6 02(AX1) 16.5 16.2(,) 16.2(.X
Hediation fent
RhI of 162(Cy2) Rok 4(e) 15 5(oX2) 10-6 04(A) 16.2(e) 16.2(e)
conaideniality
or Privihas
eposd Ru 6 16-6 02(B))
Obligaioe 16-6.05(A)
OoodFaith 11
Obligionto Role4g) 16-6.05(B)
RepaotBeokto Report
Judy Cink of
Requireen of Rle 3(e) 162.5(2) 16-6.02(BX1)
PhlAuothorit
to senh _ __
OSantiosFr Roots 3(e) 16-6.05(A)
DistrictofNarth Doota lmjtwaddoccrtsporovftdff)0C Looiatns
Diatriotaf OSotorst: 1taodewsodduscoors egooskoks0322007Bpdf
DisntrtofNettaska: ht/Aedcourotsovinedisioonkedebkvie-dolmpd
Dlstriotafhlisort: tltplAowanaideortseoutlocal ilkslioclocal mles odf
Etsan Duitaf MP ses: l'p sIhwreoesc siortszpovildOs/G0s/G050 of (Genal Order No. 50)
'AppliestesadiatedultlemenitcanerenboRe mgisets jde.
o aMdinfa im asptfthe ADRProanfa the Ds Dtrict orndses. S General Orde No.50(Phase fete the section entithoPOthe ADR
Pocsses.")
'Appliesto coots edseset tconeeinmediatianfom.
* Aplietoomtspnsores et confre ediin .
*Appliewdntheosenmedidasiooptodbythocout.
Wesem Dictali osas: lopfA vmansortsogoOM
osn DistnctafMissr Infjowmooduosovfieefadrloosnut006d
SobsaDistrictoflost
Hasthen Disuottaf bowa
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Disoct of Distrt Doirieof Ditre of Disat Distrat Cent S iof SofDis o Dtritaf
Idels of Mont- Ocep of of Distrot of Dstrt of Districtof Dorl of Aleks Gamo Nortlem
A-izona Nea& Hawai_ Cafosnia Cal&fami Califbann Caoamia Man
Exiencof 165(XIX 83.10 16.6(cXl) 16l4(X2XA 1&5 81(d)( R.I 41& 165(h)& Rabl13& 162(cXl)
Mandaory B)& ) 2) 4of 163(17)( 6-2 (B)
Meditio 165(cX2) Gen.a b)
Pongram OrderNo
070)1x
Ruboof 165(jX1) 167(bX2) 16Al(x)- sa1(k) In5of nk 600- Rle612(.) 16- 162(f(1).
Confklonily (3) Gener1 7(d) of 271(m)(1) (3)
orPrivike OrrNo. Geral070)L O0kroo
307 &
Sof
Osder,
307-A
Imposd 16(bX4)(A 16 4(f2)(C 88 1(f) Rno60&
Obligathmaf {B) ) 7(g)of
GoodFaith General
Oakr No.
307
(liga.thato 165(k)) 16.4(h)(). 88.1() R.l. 11of Rn006D- Rak6-14: 16- 162(e03)
RortnBeckto Rporoto (2) Genr1 7(f)of Repostto 271(.0l) (A-1{B)
1. ADR O.rNo G.nera ADRUnit Reosi to
Admistr 07-01. OrderNo VDRP
ator 387 Adamistr
atort16-
271(oX)
Reporto
Distrotof Anoona:03a.oooMl.ooooOoo00I.l0l.~lhO0~oo.o~o&.
Distrct of Manta: httpilwww.mtduscourts.gov/pdflD%20Mont,%20LR/20011012009.pdf
District of Orgon: http://ww.ord.uscourtsgoviuls/21006/Appedioorm/Compiled062006pdf
District of Nevda httpl/wwwardsou roo v/FilesiNVUSDisCtRules06Supo df
District ofHawaii: httpilwww hid uourtsogov/misdirfmalf 2003 pdf
Central Dirict ofCalifornia: innonwre0aw..tenetwarenamen0..a901holbse0y.conse2.0paromeovpd
Southern Distrit of Califoronia: htto//ww.casducourts.ovuploads/Ruies/Loca/%20RuleO/calRules.pdf
Sothern Disorict of Califomia: http 7//ww.cas duscooto oouploads/RuleJ/Genera/200rders/GO 387 odf
Northerso District of California-
Eastert Dostoct of Califomia: httolw wv cad oocoots.govicand/DOCUMENTSilocalRules/LocalRules.odf
District of Alska: httpl/www.akd.uscou.gomreferencerus&esr/LR%2012-08R.pdf
Dismtr of Guam: httplwww.guduscourtsgovIrules/RULES.htm
Distroct of Northern Mariana Islands: http -id uscourts go(
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10IECIRCUIT
Ditc of Distict of Dimico f Diaif Otria of Aanm Narthm Westem
New hexico ynt Ksas Colorado tah District o Distrit of Diit of
Imanaima alaam aklaam
Enhance of 16.3(b) 16.3(cXI) 16.6 16.2(t) 16.20) 16.2Q)
Mhediasion acom
hi of l.3(c2)()ii) 16.3() ADR Pln: 163(c)
Candeotulity o. Section 3(0>
Priviale (c)
Imposed Obigdion
of Good Faith I
Oblignin to Repot 16.3(&X3)&(4) ADR Plnt
Bode to Aidge Secin 6 qt)
Reportto
Clak of Cou=
Requiremt of Fail 16.3(cy1)() 16.3(cX2) ADR Pln:
Auhorty wto Setle Section 6
(ifl)(3)
sactionos fr 16.3(cXl)(vi)A( 16.3(cX5) ADR Pln:
Nao minte vii) L I Setif 6
District ofNewlhico htto:Iwww.nmcourtfe I.us/weblDCDOCSliles/Final 2008-September-09.odf
District of Wyoming: httpillww.wyd sncocurts ovdfformsflocabnles-cv.df
District of Kansas: htto ilwww)1sd.uscouis* uvfrlmesilocaholes08.pdf
District of Colorado: htt:/ww cod.uscours.ovDocuments/LocalRulesLR wAnpsAztdAtts Hyorinlddfm
District of Utah: httn://www.utd oscourts.covklocuments)06rules.htmlf#DUCivR%2016-2
District of Utah: http/llwww.utd.wcourtsovidocuments/06nles.html#5ECTION%203 (ADRPlan)
Easten District of Oklahoma: httoI:/www.oked.uscourtsaovinles main.htm
Northern District ofOklahoma: oo nnyoww.2. oeo.e anoog3em osommunesessnnoo neesoainoeov2oreseoe
Western District ofOklahoma: httolflwww okwdticourts eovifileslhules pdf
The District Courts in Oklahoma refer to settlement conferences, rather than mediation.
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11CIM CUIT
Dis= of
Geog
Distrif of Diona of Dita of Dsita D o
Abm Al n An 1a Aha o
isti  DiMi
Florid of
IESn of 16.7(B1X) 16.1(c)btm 16.6; tile 16.1(c),tlo 9.03(.) 162(DX1) 16.3()
MIand y see IV(A)of Il. RMferul
Medition "Heditig k lmandive of Cues to
Prop the Middle Disp=n ADR (B)
Disrictf Reohlin (ADR P1)
Alb " Pltt"
tl of 16.7(I)4)(5) 16.7.8 16.2 Ible IV. tie IV. 16.2(GX2)
Ctfadersiday (AXII)of ADR Trotk
Porile "Alemtv (BX10)
Dipute (ADR Pla)
Ronnian
Plan" ____ ___
osed l63' 16.6; Also
Obligtian a 16o(f) implied duly
Good FAith of good fith
fo.d a tile
IV(A)r)o
"Altane
Diwte
Resoin
_______ _________Plan"
Repartlackto Reportto (A)1XIXar ADR
uldgp Clk "A ci TRACK
Dispute (Epyg)
Resohtion (ADR Pln)
PWm
Requoiemt of 16.7()() 16.7.6(c) & ile IV.(A)8) tiu IV. 9.05(c) 16.2(E)
Wu hmody (O) of "Akeunaie ADR Troth
to Salt Dispute (B)(7) (ADR
Resohtian Pla)
_____ ____ Plan" _ _ _ _ _
Sugae f. 16.7(IX1) 16 7.6(() tile IV(A)(). oe.IV .X0 . 16.2(E)
Hancomnplinet of "AktMative ADR Trhck (e)
Diopue (B)7() (ADR
Reohion Plai)
Middle District of Georgia: http llwwadwcourts cVoocal%20mlesthrombed6.211YPrird pd
Northern DistrkofGeorgia: ittpvww.gad.uscourts ovipdflNDGA~ulesCV.pdf
Southem DistilofGeotia: hp:/wAww.gasdscours.eovlr/3hlt*16
Middle District of Alalama http:/Aww.almd.uscourtsnvodocsibriles.odf
Middle DistictifAlabana httpilwww.ahdnuscourts.govrulesprodocs/MEDIAION PAGE.pdf "MediatingttheMiddle DistridtofAlbaa"
SouthemDistiltof Ahbarna: Ittp:lwww.alsascourts ovdocueriformslocalules df
Southemn Distit of Abbama tp/Avww aluscourts ovidocumedforms/ADRolanpdf Altanative Dispute IesolutionPhn
Northern Distrid of Abbama ltp:Ilww aliuscourtsnrilncallbcal ruleslt
NoritheDistitoftAhbama: httpJlww.alduscourtsonlco di r Planlm ADRPlm
Middle DistridcofFbrida ltpJiA'wwhadocourtsmvFornmISDC-MDFL-LocalhalesS-O26ndf
Southem Ditist ofFblida htpAww.flsdwscourts.ovviewedvwar asp?file=/locabuleslocahules200df
Northem DistrM ofFbfida ttplAwww.fundescourtsmvionnsCourt t WOleslocal rules olf
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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
District of Columbial
Existence of Mandatory Mediation 84.4(a)(2)
Program
Rule of Confidentiality or Privilege 84.9(a)-(b)
Imposed Obligation of Good Faith See section entitled "Compliance Judge'
under Appendix A entitled 'Dispute
Resolution Program.'
Obligation to Report Back to Judge 84.7(d)(3)
Requirement of Full Authority to Settle 84.8(a)
Sanctions for Noncompliance 84.10
District of Columbia: http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/LocalRules.pdf
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